Temporary natural resource cartels
AbstractWe analyze the behavior of a nonrenewable resource cartel that anticipates being forced, at some date in the future, to break-up into an oligopolistic market in which its members will then have to compete as rivals. Under reasonable assumptions about the value function of the individual firms in the oligopolistic equilibrium that follows the break-up, we show that the cartel will then produce more over the same interval of time than it would if there were no threat of dissolution, and that its rate of extraction is a decreasing function of the cartelâs life; that there are circumstances under which the cartel will attach a negative marginal value to the resource stocks, in which case the rate of depletion will be increasing over time during the cartel phase; that, for a given date of dissolution, the equilibrium stocks allocated to the post-cartel phase will increase as a function of the total initial stocks, whereas those allocated to the cartel phase will increase at first, but begin decreasing beyond some level of the total initial stocks.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Environmental Economics and Management.
Volume (Year): 52 (2006)
Issue (Month): 3 (November)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622870
Other versions of this item:
- BENCHEKROUN, Hassan & GAUDET, Gérard & LONG, Ngo Van, 2004. "Temporary Natural Resource Cartels," Cahiers de recherche 2004-02, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
- BENCHEKROUN, Hassan & GAUDET, Gérard & LONG, Ngo Van, 2004. "Temporary Natural Resource Cartels," Cahiers de recherche 03-2004, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
- Q3 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
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