International Trade in Exhaustible Resources: A Cartel-Competitive Fringe Model
AbstractWe characterize the open-loop and the Markov-Perfect Stackelberg equilibria for a differential game in which a cartel and a fringe extract a non-renewable resource. Both agents have stock dependent costs. The comparison of initial market shares, across different equilibria, depends on which firm has the cost advantage. The cartel's steady-state market share is largest in the open-loop equilibrium and the smallest in the competitive equilibrium. The initial price may be larger in the Markov equilibria (relative to the open-loop equilibrium), so less market power is consistent with an equilibrium that appears less competitive. The benefit to cartelization increases with market share.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 1291.
Date of creation: Jan 1996
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Other versions of this item:
- Karp, Larry & Tahvonen, Olli, 1995. "International Trade in Exhaustible Resources: A Cartel-Competitive Fringe Model," Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series qt9dt5614j, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley.
- D12 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis
- E21 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Consumption; Saving; Wealth
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