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Licenciements, salaire aux pièces et participation aux bénéfices en tant qu'incitations


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  • Kornelius Kraft


[spa] Los beneficios como incitaciones, . por Kornelius Kraft.. . Los despidos, o incluso la simple amenaza de despidos, la repartición de los beneficios, la remuneración por unidad producida son incitaciones eventualmente sustituibles, a la disposición de la empresa. En particular los asalariados despedidos tienen desventajas, aún si terminan encontrando un empleo igualmente remunerado. El propósito del artículo es el de probar empíricamente, partiendo de informaciones relativas a empresas de la RFA, en qué medida estas incitaciones mejoran la eficacia. Parece ser que la remuneración por unidad producida no es eficaz, que la repartición del beneficio lo es, y que los despidos mejoran la productividad, pero solamente sin llegar a un cierto umbral, y de manera independiente del nivel de la remuneración. [fre] Licenciements, salaire aux pièces et participation aux bénéfices en tant qu'incitations, . par Kornelius Kraft.. . Les licenciements, ou même la simple menace de licenciements, le partage des profits, la rémunération à la pièce sont des incitations, éventuellement substituables, à la disposition de l'entreprise. En particulier les salariés licenciés subissent des coûts, même s'ils finissent par retrouver un emploi également rémunéré. Le but de l'article est de tester empiriquement, à partir d'informations portant sur des entreprises de la Rfa, dans quelle mesure ces incitations améliorent l'efficacité. Il apparaît que la rémunération à la pièce n'est pas efficace, que le partage du profit l'est, et que les licenciements améliorent la productivité, mais seulement en deçà d'un certain seuil, et de manière indépendante du niveau de la rémunération. [ger] Entlassungen, Stücklohn und Gewinnbeteiligung als Anreize, . von Kornelius Kraft.. . Entlassungen, oder schon allein drohende Entlassungen, Gewinnbeteiligung, Stucklohn, sind eventuell substituierbare Anreize, die den Unternehmen zur Verfügung stehen. Insbesondere entlassene Lohnempfänger müssen Nachteile auf sich nehmen, selbst wenn sie letzten Endes wieder eine Beschäftigung mit gleicher Bezahlung finden. Der Artikel zielt darauf ab, auf der Grundlage von Daten über die Unternehmen in der BRD empirisch zu testen, in welchem Ausmass dièse Anreize die Leistungsfähigkeit erhöhen. Es stellt sich heraus, dass im Gegensatz zum Stücklohn die Gewinnbeteiligung wirksam ist und dass Entlassungen die Leistungsfähigkeit erhöhen, aber nur bis zu einer gewissen Grenze und unabhängig von der Höhe der Entlohnung. [eng] Lay-offs, Piece-Rates and Profit-Sharing as Incentives, . by Kornelius Kraft.. . Lay-offs, or even just the likelihood of being laid off, profit-sharing and piece-rates are incentives which can be used alternatively. In particular, laid off wage earners have expenses even if they do end up finding work with the same remuneration. The purpose of the paper is to empirically test to what extent these incentives do increase effectiveness, based on information from German firms. Piecework pay is apparently not effective, profit-sharing is and lay-offs increase productivity but only underneath a certain threshold, regardless of the remuneration level.

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Article provided by Programme National Persée in its journal Économie & prévision.

Volume (Year): 92 (1990)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 161-170

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Handle: RePEc:prs:ecoprv:ecop_0249-4744_1990_num_92_1_5167

Note: DOI:doi:10.3406/ecop.1990.5167
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  1. Pencavel, John H, 1972. "Wages, Specific Training, and Labor Turnover in US Manufacturing Industries," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 13(1), pages 53-64, February.
  2. Weitzman, Martin L, 1983. "Some Macroeconomic Implications of Alternative Compensation Systems," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 93(372), pages 763-83, December.
  3. Jerry R. Green & Nancy L. Stokey, 1982. "A Comparison of Tournaments and Contracts," NBER Working Papers 0840, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Newey, Whitney K., 1987. "Specification tests for distributional assumptions in the Tobit model," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 34(1-2), pages 125-145.
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  7. Hashimoto, Masanori & Raisian, John, 1985. "Employment Tenure and Earnings Profiles in Japan and the United States," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(4), pages 721-35, September.
  8. Mookherjee, Dilip, 1984. "Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(3), pages 433-46, July.
  9. Yellen, Janet L, 1984. "Efficiency Wage Models of Unemployment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(2), pages 200-205, May.
  10. Leibenstein, Harvey, 1979. "A Branch of Economics is Missing: Micro-Micro Theory," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 17(2), pages 477-502, June.
  11. Blanchflower, David G & Oswald, Andrew J, 1987. "Profit Sharing--Can It Work?," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 39(1), pages 1-19, March.
  12. Williamson, Oliver E., 1980. "The organization of work a comparative institutional assessment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 5-38, March.
  13. Robert E. Hall, 1984. "The Importance of Lifetime Jobs in the U.S. Economy," NBER Working Papers 0560, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  14. Wales, T J & Woodland, A D, 1980. "Sample Selectivity and the Estimation of Labor Supply Functions," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 21(2), pages 437-68, June.
  15. Hausman, Jerry A, 1978. "Specification Tests in Econometrics," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(6), pages 1251-71, November.
  16. Lazear, Edward P & Rosen, Sherwin, 1981. "Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(5), pages 841-64, October.
  17. Weitzman, Martin L, 1985. "The Simple Macroeconomics of Profit Sharing," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(5), pages 937-53, December.
  18. Shapiro, Carl & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1984. "Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(3), pages 433-44, June.
  19. Krueger, Alan B & Summers, Lawrence H, 1988. "Efficiency Wages and the Inter-industry Wage Structure," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(2), pages 259-93, March.
  20. Frank, Robert H, 1984. "Are Workers Paid Their Marginal Products?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(4), pages 549-71, September.
  21. Green, Jerry & Stokey, Nancy, 1983. "A Comparison of Tournaments and Contracts," Scholarly Articles 3203644, Harvard University Department of Economics.
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