Auctioneers vs. commissaires-priseurs: The carnival mirror of profession regulation in the international art market
AbstractThis paper is a comparative analysis of the recent evolution of the French and the Anglo-Saxon profession regulations of auctioneers in terms of entry barriers and exercise of the profession. Firstly, following Stephen and Love's (1999) framework of the regulation of legal profession, we highlight the differences between regulations focussing on different levels (entry restrictions, advertising, fees, fee contracts, and organisational form). We show that French commissaire-priseurs and Anglo-Saxon auctioneers are bounded to quite opposed rules, relating to both the level of regulation (licensing against registration or certification) and the scope of this regulation. Secondly, we try to assess the success of these regulations in terms of economic efficiency by comparing the international markets shares of French and Anglo-Saxon auctioneers. We further highlight how a weak regulation can disturb prices mechanisms and, in some cases, favour speculation. The discussion of some emblematic scandals highlights distortions provoked by a strong, as well as a weak regulation
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Cattaneo University (LIUC) in its journal The European Journal of Comparative Economics.
Volume (Year): 10 (2013)
Issue (Month): 2 (August)
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More information through EDIRC
Art market; Profession regulation; Auctioneers; Cross-country analysis;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- J44 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Professional Labor Markets and Occupations
- L43 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
- Z11 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economics of the Arts and Literature
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
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