1. Arellano, Manuel & Bond, Stephen, 1991. "Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 58(2), pages 277-97, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. Alberto Alesina & Ignazio Angeloni & Ludger Schuknecht, 2001. "What Does the European Union Do?," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1935, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Alberto Alesina & Ignazio Angeloni & Ludger Schuknecht, 2001. "What Does the European Union Do?," NBER Working Papers 8647, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   • Alesina, Alberto F & Angeloni, Ignazio & Schuknecht, Ludger, 2002. "What Does the European Union Do?," CEPR Discussion Papers 3115, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   • Alberto Alesina & Ignazio Angeloni & Ludger Schuknecht, 2005. "What does the European Union do?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 123(3), pages 275-319, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
3. Streit, Manfred E. & Voigt, Stefan, 1996. "Toward ever closer union--or ever larger? Or both? Entry to the European Union from the perspective of constitutional economics," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 385-388, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
4. Barnett, Michael N & Finnemore, Martha, 1999. "The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations," International Organization, MIT Press, vol. 53(4), pages 699-732, Autumn.
5. Przeworski, Adam & Vreeland, James Raymond, 2000. "The effect of IMF programs on economic growth," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 385-421, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
6. Vaubel, Roland, 1994. " The Political Economy of Centralization and the European Community," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 81(1-2), pages 151-90, October.
7. Pollack, Mark A, 1997. "Delegation, Agency, and Agenda Setting in the European Community," International Organization, MIT Press, vol. 51(1), pages 99-134, Winter.
8. Axel Dreher, 2003. "The influence of elections on IMF programme interruptions," The Journal of Development Studies, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 39(6), pages 101-120, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
9. Nielson, Daniel L. & Tierney, Michael J., 2003. "Delegation to International Organizations: Agency Theory and World Bank Environmental Reform," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 57(02), pages 241-276, April. [Downloadable!]
10. Lake, David A., 1996. "Anarchy, hierarchy, and the variety of international relations," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 50(01), pages 1-33, December. [Downloadable!]
11. Axel Dreher, 2004. "The Influence of IMF Programs on the Re-election of Debtor Governments," Economics and Politics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 16(1), pages 53-76, 03. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
12. Frey, Bruno S., 1984. "The public choice view of international political economy," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 38(01), pages 199-223, December. [Downloadable!]
13. Pollack, Mark A., 1997. "Delegation, agency, and agenda setting in the European Community," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 51(01), pages 99-134, December. [Downloadable!]
14. Barnett, Michael N. & Finnemore, Martha, 1999. "The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 53(04), pages 699-732, October. [Downloadable!]

Cited by:
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1. Coicaud, Jean-Marc, 2006. "International Organizations as a Profession: Professional Mobility and Power Distribution," Working Papers RP2006/109, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER). [Downloadable!]
2. Axel Dreher & Stefan Voigt, 2008. "Does Membership in International Organizations Increase Governments’ Credibility? Testing the Effects of Delegating Powers," KOF Working papers 08-193, KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Axel Dreher & Stefan Voigt, 2008. "Does Membership in International Organizations Increase Governments’ Credibility? Testing the Effects of Delegating Powers," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
   • Axel Dreher & Stefan Voigt, 2008. "Does Membership in International Organizations Increase Governments’ Credibility? Testing the Effects of Delegating Powers," MAGKS Papers on Economics 200819, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung). [Downloadable!]
3. Michele Fratianni & John Pattison, 2004. "Who is Running the IMF: Critical Shareholders or the Staff?," Working Papers 2004-06, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Michele FRATIANNI & John PATTISON, 2007. "Who Is Runninc the IMF: Critical Shareholders or the Staff?," Working Papers 279, Universita' Politecnica delle Marche (I), Dipartimento di Economia. [Downloadable!]
4. Jonathan B. Slapin and Julia Gray, University of Pittsburgh, 2009. "Why Some Regional Trade Agreements Work: Private Rents, Exit Options, and Legalization," The Institute for International Integration Studies Discussion Paper Series iiisdp289, IIIS. [Downloadable!]
5. Axel Dreher & Roland Vaubel, 2003. "The Causes and Consequences of IMF Conditionality," International Finance 0309004, EconWPA, revised 17 Oct 2003. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Axel Dreher & Roland Vaubel, 2001. "The Causes and Consequences of IMF Conditionality," Emerging Markets Finance and Trade, M.E. Sharpe, Inc., vol. 40(3), pages 26-54, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
6. Axel Dreher & Nathan Jensen, 2005. "Independent Actor or Agent? An Empirical Analysis of the impact of US interests on IMF Conditions," KOF Working papers 05-118, KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Axel Dreher & Nathan Jensen, 2003. "Independent Actor or Agent? An Empirical Analysis of the impact of US interests on IMF Conditions," International Finance 0310004, EconWPA, revised 08 Jan 2004. [Downloadable!]
7. Christian Bjørnskov & Axel Dreher & Justina A. V. Fischer, 2005. "The bigger the better? Evidence of the effect of government size on life satisfaction around the world," Economics working paper series 05/44, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Christian Bjørnskov & Axel Dreher & Justina Fischer, 2007. "The bigger the better? Evidence of the effect of government size on life satisfaction around the world," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 130(3), pages 267-292, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)