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Potential competition and coordination in a market-entry game

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  • Kofi Nti

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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/BF01227449
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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Economics Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie.

    Volume (Year): 71 (2000)
    Issue (Month): 2 (June)
    Pages: 149-165

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    Handle: RePEc:kap:jeczfn:v:71:y:2000:i:2:p:149-165

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    Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=108909

    Related research

    Keywords: entry coordination; investment rivalry; potential competition; D43; D72; L13;

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    References

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    1. Glenn C. Loury, 1976. "Market Structure and Innovation," Discussion Papers 256, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    2. Rogerson, William P, 1989. "Profit Regulation of Defense Contractors and Prizes for Innovation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(6), pages 1284-1305, December.
    3. Van Huyck John B. & Battalio Raymond C. & Beil Richard O., 1993. "Asset Markets as an Equilibrium Selection Mechanism: Coordination Failure, Game Form Auctions, and Tacit Communication," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 485-504, July.
    4. Christensen, Laurits Rolf & Caves, Richard E, 1997. "Cheap Talk and Investment Rivalry in the Pulp and Paper Industry," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(1), pages 47-73, March.
    5. Vijay Krishna & John Morgan, 1994. "An Analysis of the War of Attrition and the All-Pay Auction," Game Theory and Information 9409002, EconWPA.
    6. Cabral, Luís M B, 1997. "Entry Mistakes," CEPR Discussion Papers 1729, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    7. Richard J. Gilbert and Marvin Lieberman., 1987. "Investment and Coordination in Oligopolistic Industries," Economics Working Papers 8730, University of California at Berkeley.
    8. Dan Kovenock & Michael R. Baye & Casper G. de Vries, 1996. "The all-pay auction with complete information (*)," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 8(2), pages 291-305.
    9. Elberfeld, Walter & Wolfstetter, Elmar, 1999. "A dynamic model of Bertrand competition with entry," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 513-525, May.
    10. Yates, Andrew J. & Heckelman, Jac C., 2001. "Rent-setting in multiple winner rent-seeking contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 835-852, November.
    11. Smith, Richard L, II, 1981. "Efficiency Gains from Strategic Investment," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(1), pages 1-23, September.
    12. Nitzan, Shmuel, 1994. "Modelling rent-seeking contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 41-60, May.
    13. L. Wade, 1988. "Review," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 58(1), pages 99-100, July.
    14. Cachon, Gerard P & Camerer, Colin F, 1996. "Loss-Avoidance and Forward Induction in Experimental Coordination Games," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 111(1), pages 165-94, February.
    15. Vives, Xavier, 1988. "Sequential entry, industry structure and welfare," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 32(8), pages 1671-1687, October.
    16. Sharkey, William W. & Sibley, David S., 1993. "A Bertrand model of pricing and entry," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 199-206.
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    Cited by:
    1. Norbäck, Pehr-Johan & Persson, Lars, 2002. "Cross-Border Acquisitions and Greenfield Entry," Working Paper Series 570, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
    2. Yates, Andrew J. & Heckelman, Jac C., 2001. "Rent-setting in multiple winner rent-seeking contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 835-852, November.

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