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A Rent-Seeking Model of Voluntary Overcompliance: Addendum

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  • Marco A. Haan

    (University of Groningen)

Abstract

In a previous paper (Haan in Environ Resour Econ, 2016) I missed some relevant literature essentially related to that paper. In this addendum I discuss how two earlier contributions (Graichen et al. in Public Choice 108:273–293, 2001; Liston-Heyes in J Environ Econ Manag 41:1–12, 2001) are related to Haan (Environ Resour Econ, 2016), and how Haan (Environ Resour Econ, 2016) differs from those contributions.

Suggested Citation

  • Marco A. Haan, 2016. "A Rent-Seeking Model of Voluntary Overcompliance: Addendum," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 65(1), pages 313-315, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:enreec:v:65:y:2016:i:1:d:10.1007_s10640-016-0014-6
    DOI: 10.1007/s10640-016-0014-6
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Epstein, Gil S. & Nitzan, Shmuel, 2004. "Strategic restraint in contests," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 201-210, February.
    2. Marco A. Haan, 2016. "A Rent-Seeking Model of Voluntary Overcompliance," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 65(1), pages 297-312, September.
    3. Graichen, Patrick R & Requate, Till & Dijkstra, Bouwe R, 2001. "How to Win the Political Contest: A Monopolist vs. Environmentalists," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 108(3-4), pages 273-293, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Michael Finus & Bianca Rundshagen, 2016. "Game Theory and Environmental and Resource Economics—In Honour of Alfred Endres, Part Two," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 65(1), pages 1-4, September.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Voluntary overcompliance; Regulation; Rent-seeking;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • Q50 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - General
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation

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