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Lobbying contests with endogenous policy proposals

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  • Münster, Johannes

Abstract

Lobbyists choose what to lobby for. If they can precommit to certain policy proposals, their choice will have an influence on the behavior of opposing lobbyists. Hence lobbyists have an incentive to moderate their policy proposals in order to reduce the intensity of the lobbying contest. This logic has been explored in a number of recent papers. I reconsider the topic with a perfectly discriminating contest. With endogenous policy proposals, there is a subgame perfect equilibrium where the proposals of the lobbyists coincide and maximize joint welfare; moreover, this equilibrium is the only one that survives repeated elimination of dominated strategies. Hence there is no rent dissipation at all. A politician trying to maximize lobbying expenditures would prefer an imperfectly discriminating contest.

Suggested Citation

  • Münster, Johannes, 2005. "Lobbying contests with endogenous policy proposals," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 41, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    • Handle: RePEc:trf:wpaper:41
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Ashish Chaturvedi & Amihai Glazer, 2005. "Competitive Proposals of Policies by Lobbies," Working Papers 050614, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Interest groups; Endogenous lobbying targets; Voluntary restraint; Polarization;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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