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The Struggle over Migration Policy

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  • Epstein, Gil S.

    ()
    (Bar-Ilan University)

  • Nitzan, Shmuel

    ()
    (Bar-Ilan University)

Abstract

In this paper we analyze the endogenous determination of migration quota viewing it as an outcome of a two-stage political struggle between two interest groups: those in favor and those against the proposed migration quota. We first compare the proposed policies of the two interest groups under random behavior of the government, with and without lobbying. The paper proceeds with the examination of the effect of government intervention in the proposal of the quota on its nature, assuming that, with and without government intervention, the uncertain approval of the proposal is the outcome of a lobbying contest between the two interest groups. Finally, we examine the effect that the status-quo policy has on the proposed government's policy.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number 1533.

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Length: 33 pages
Date of creation: Mar 2005
Date of revision:
Publication status: published in: Journal of Population Economics, 2006, 19 (4), 703-723
Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp1533

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Keywords: interest groups; government intervention; migration quota;

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  1. Fabella, Raul V., 1995. "The social cost of rent seeking under countervailing opposition to distortionary transfers," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 235-247, June.
  2. Carrington, William J & Detragiache, Enrica & Vishwanath, Tara, 1996. "Migration with Endogenous Moving Costs," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 86(4), pages 909-30, September.
  3. Schmidt, Christoph M. & Stilz, Anette & Zimmermann, Klaus F., 1994. "Mass migration, unions, and government intervention," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 185-201, October.
  4. Hillman, Arye L. & Weiss, Avi, 1999. "A theory of permissible illegal immigration," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 15(4), pages 585-604, November.
  5. Benhabib, Jess, 1996. "On the political economy of immigration," European Economic Review, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 40(9), pages 1737-1743, December.
  6. George J. Borjas, 1995. "The Economic Benefits from Immigration," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 9(2), pages 3-22, Spring.
  7. Torsten Schmidt, 1992. "Rent-Seeking Firms And Consumers: An Equilibrium Analysis," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 4(2), pages 137-149, 07.
  8. Alex Cukierman & Zvi Hercowitz & David Pines, 1994. "The Political Economy of Immigration," Public Economics, EconWPA 9405002, EconWPA.
  9. Epstein, Gil S. & Hillman, Arye L., 2003. "Unemployed immigrants and voter sentiment in the welfare state," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 87(7-8), pages 1641-1655, August.
  10. Ethier, Wilfred J, 1986. "Illegal Immigration," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 76(2), pages 258-62, May.
  11. Baik, Kyung Hwan, 1999. "Rent-Seeking Firms, Consumer Groups, and the Social Costs of Monopoly," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, Western Economic Association International, vol. 37(3), pages 541-53, July.
  12. Onsong Shin & Michael R. Baye, 1999. "Strategic Behavior in Contests: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 89(3), pages 691-693, June.
  13. Gil S. Epstein & Shmuel Nitzan, 2003. "Political culture and monopoly price determination," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 21(1), pages 1-19, 08.
  14. Buckley, F. H., 1996. "The political economy of immigration policies," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 81-99, March.
  15. George J. Borjas, 1994. "The Economics of Immigration," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 32(4), pages 1667-1717, December.
  16. Epstein, Gil S & Hillman, Arye L. & Weiss, Avi, 1998. "Creating Illegal Immigrants," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 1796, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  17. Gil S. Epstein & Shmuel Nitzan, 2002. "Politics of Randomness," CESifo Working Paper Series 803, CESifo Group Munich.
  18. Gang, Ira N & Rivera-Batiz, Francisco L, 1994. "Labor Market Effects of Immigration in the United States and Europe: Substitution vs. Complementarity," Journal of Population Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 7(2), pages 157-75.
  19. Dixit, Avinash K, 1987. "Strategic Behavior in Contests," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 891-98, December.
  20. Gil Epstein & Shmuel Nitzan, 2006. "The Politics of Randomness," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 423-433, October.
  21. Gil S. Epstein & Shmuel Nitzan, 2000. "Strategic Restraint in Contests," CESifo Working Paper Series 271, CESifo Group Munich.
  22. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1996. "Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 63(2), pages 265-86, April.
  23. Ellingsen, T., 1990. "Strategic Buyers and the Social Cost of Monopoly," Papers, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration- 05-90, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration-.
  24. Nitzan, Shmuel, 1994. "Modelling rent-seeking contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 41-60, May.
  25. Chiswick, Barry R & Miller, Paul M, 1996. "Ethnic Networks and Language Proficiency among Immigrants," Journal of Population Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 9(1), pages 19-35, February.
  26. Gil S. Epstein, 2003. "Labor Market Interactions Between Legal and Illegal Immigrants," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 7(1), pages 30-43, February.
  27. Baik, Kyung Hwan & Kim, In-Gyu, 1997. "Delegation in contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 281-298, May.
  28. Christian Dustmann & Ian Preston, 2004. "Is Immigration Good or Bad for the Economy? Analysis of Attitudinal Responses," CReAM Discussion Paper Series 0406, Centre for Research and Analysis of Migration (CReAM), Department of Economics, University College London.
  29. Boeri, Tito & Hanson, Gordon H. & McCormick, Barry (ed.), 2002. "Immigration Policy and the Welfare System: A Report for the Fondazione Rodolfo Debenedetti," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, number 9780199256310, October.
  30. J. Amegashie, 2004. "A political economy model of immigration quotas," Economics of Governance, Springer, Springer, vol. 5(3), pages 255-267, November.
  31. Gil S. Epstein & Shmuel Nitzan, 2005. "Lobbying and Compromise," CESifo Working Paper Series 1413, CESifo Group Munich.
  32. Jeffrey Church & Ian King, 1993. "Bilingualism and Network Externalities," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 26(2), pages 337-45, May.
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