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The Struggle over Migration Policy

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Author Info
Epstein, Gil S. () (Bar-Ilan University, CEPR and IZA Bonn)
Nitzan, Shmuel (Bar-Ilan University)

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Abstract

In this paper we analyze the endogenous determination of migration quota viewing it as an outcome of a two-stage political struggle between two interest groups: those in favor and those against the proposed migration quota. We first compare the proposed policies of the two interest groups under random behavior of the government, with and without lobbying. The paper proceeds with the examination of the effect of government intervention in the proposal of the quota on its nature, assuming that, with and without government intervention, the uncertain approval of the proposal is the outcome of a lobbying contest between the two interest groups. Finally, we examine the effect that the status-quo policy has on the proposed government's policy.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number 1533.

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Length: 33 pages
Date of creation: Mar 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp1533

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Related research
Keywords: migration quota; interest groups; government intervention;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
J61 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, and Vacancies - - - Geographic Labor Mobility; Immigrant Workers
J81 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor Standards - - - Working Conditions

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Hillman, Arye L. & Weiss, Avi, 1999. "A theory of permissible illegal immigration," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 15(4), pages 585-604, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Epstein, Gil S. & Nitzan, Shmuel, 2002. "Politics of Randomness," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  3. Fabella, Raul V., 1995. "The social cost of rent seeking under countervailing opposition to distortionary transfers," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 235-247, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Barry Chiswick & Paul Miller, 1996. "Ethnic networks and language proficiency among immigrants," Journal of Population Economics, Springer, vol. 9(1), pages 19-35, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Michael R. Baye & Onsong Shin, 1999. "Strategic Behavior in Contests: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(3), pages 691-693, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Epstein, Gil S. & Nitzan, Shmuel, 2004. "Strategic restraint in contests," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 201-210, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  7. Jeffrey Church & Ian King, 1993. "Bilingualism and Network Externalities," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 26(2), pages 337-45, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Gil S. Epstein & Shmuel Nitzan, 2003. "Political culture and monopoly price determination," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 21(1), pages 1-19, 08. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  9. Schmidt, Christoph M. & Stilz, Anette & Zimmermann, Klaus F., 1994. "Mass migration, unions, and government intervention," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 185-201, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. George J. Borjas, 1994. "The Economic Benefits from Immigration," NBER Working Papers 4955, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  11. Gil Epstein & Shmuel Nitzan, 2006. "The Politics of Randomness," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 423-433, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Christian Dustmann & Ian Preston, 2004. "Is Immigration Good or Bad for the Economy? Analysis of Attitudinal Responses," CReAM Discussion Paper Series 0406, Centre for Research and Analysis of Migration (CReAM), Department of Economics, University College London. [Downloadable!]
  13. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1996. "Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 63(2), pages 265-86, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  14. Ethier, Wilfred J, 1986. "Illegal Immigration," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(2), pages 258-62, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Dixit, Avinash K, 1987. "Strategic Behavior in Contests," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 891-98, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Avi Weiss & Arye L. Hillman & Gil S. Epstein, 1999. "Creating illegal immigrants," Journal of Population Economics, Springer, vol. 12(1), pages 3-21. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  17. Epstein, Gil S. & Hillman, Arye L., 2003. "Unemployed immigrants and voter sentiment in the welfare state," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(7-8), pages 1641-1655, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Nitzan, Shmuel, 1994. "Modelling rent-seeking contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 41-60, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. Gil S. Epstein & Shmuel Nitzan, 2005. "Lobbying and Compromise," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  20. Benhabib, Jess, 1996. "On the political economy of immigration," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(9), pages 1737-1743, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  21. Baik, Kyung Hwan & Kim, In-Gyu, 1997. "Delegation in contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 281-298, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  22. George J. Borjas, 1994. "The Economics of Immigration," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 32(4), pages 1667-1717, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  23. J. Amegashie, 2004. "A political economy model of immigration quotas," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 5(3), pages 255-267, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  24. Gil S. Epstein, 2003. "Labor Market Interactions Between Legal and Illegal Immigrants," Review of Development Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 7(1), pages 30-43, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  25. Carrington, William J & Detragiache, Enrica & Vishwanath, Tara, 1996. "Migration with Endogenous Moving Costs," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(4), pages 909-30, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  26. Alex Cukierman & Zvi Hercowitz & David Pines, 1994. "The Political Economy of Immigration," Public Economics 9405002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  27. Baik, Kyung Hwan, 1999. "Rent-Seeking Firms, Consumer Groups, and the Social Costs of Monopoly," Economic Inquiry, Oxford University Press, vol. 37(3), pages 541-53, July.
  28. Gang, Ira N & Rivera-Batiz, Francisco L, 1994. "Labor Market Effects of Immigration in the United States and Europe: Substitution vs. Complementarity," Journal of Population Economics, Springer, vol. 7(2), pages 157-75.
  29. Buckley, F. H., 1996. "The political economy of immigration policies," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 81-99, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  30. Ellingsen, Tore, 1991. "Strategic Buyers and the Social Cost of Monopoly," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(3), pages 648-57, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Giorgio Bellettini & Carlotta Berti Ceroni, 2005. "When the Union Hurts the Workers: A Positive Analysis of Immigration Policy," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  2. Michele Moretto & Sergio Vergalli, 2008. "Managing Migration through Quotas: an Option-theory Perspective," Working Papers 2008.51, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Gil S. Epstein & Odelia Heizler (Cohen), 2007. "Illegal Migration, Enforcement and Minimum Wage," IZA Discussion Papers 2830, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Amegashie, J.A., 2002. "A Political Economy Model of Immigration Quotas," Working Papers 2002-9, University of Guelph, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  5. Avichai Snir & Daniel Levy, 2005. "Popular Perceptions and Political Economy in the Contrived World of Harry Potter," Others 0509012, EconWPA, revised 04 Jan 2006. [Downloadable!]
  6. Bianchi, Milo, 2006. "Immigration Policy and Self-Selecting Migrants," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 627, Stockholm School of Economics, revised 02 Nov 2006. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Johannes Münster, 2005. "Lobbying contests with endogenous policy proposals," Discussion Papers 41, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
  8. Avichai Snir & Daniel Levy, 2005. "Abracadabra! Social Norms and Public Perceptions through Harry Potter’s Looking Glasses," Emory Economics 0528, Department of Economics, Emory University (Atlanta). [Downloadable!]
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