Constitutional choice and European immigration policy
AbstractThe EU’s immigration policy is evaluated from the standpoint of constitutional economics. The main conclusion is that European immigration policy is trapped in a system of constitutional regulations that is too rigid as it is exclusively oriented towards the protection and securitisation of European borders. As such, it is not capable of allowing the development of a problem-solving capacity based on successive trials, and this produces negative outcomes for the whole of the EU. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, LLC 2007
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Constitutional Political Economy.
Volume (Year): 18 (2007)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=102866
Immigration; Constitutional choice; F22;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- F22 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - International Migration
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