Information Aggregation and Communication in Organizations
AbstractOperating units must communicate their private information regarding decisions to be taken in organizations. This paper characterizes the optimal communication structures assuming that (i) a decision maker is fired whenever he makes a decision that proves wrong ex post relative to the status quo; and (ii) direct communication in a group of kunits may result in the loss of messages with a probability that solely depends on the group size. Several levels of partitioning with direct communication taking place in each group are required. It is shown that there exists a group size that allows communication technology to be exploited optimally: The optimal communication structure is such that it is essentially composed of groups of this size only at every level of partitioning.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by INFORMS in its journal Management Science.
Volume (Year): 45 (1999)
Issue (Month): 5 (May)
information; communication; organization;
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