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Executive pay and firm performance in the Philippines

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Author Info

  • Unite, Angelo A.
  • Sullivan, Michael J.
  • Brookman, Jeffrey
  • Majadillas, Mary Anne
  • Taningco, Angelo

Abstract

This paper provides the first systematic evidence on the nature of the relation between executive compensation and firm performance in the Philippines. Comparable to studies of Japan, Korea, and China, we find a positive relation between executive compensation and performance in the Philippines for those firms not affiliated to a corporate group, but that this relation does not hold for affiliated firms. We conclude that the substantial portion of the Philippine economy that is under the control of group networks incentivize managers in ways other than through use of pay-performance schemes.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Pacific-Basin Finance Journal.

Volume (Year): 16 (2008)
Issue (Month): 5 (November)
Pages: 606-623

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Handle: RePEc:eee:pacfin:v:16:y:2008:i:5:p:606-623

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/pacfin

Related research

Keywords: Executive compensation Corporate governance Emerging markets;

References

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Intan Oviantari Author_Email: ioviantari@yahoo.com, 2011. "Directors And Commissioners Remuneration And Firm Performance: Indonesian Evidence," 2nd International Conference on Business and Economic Research (2nd ICBER 2011) Proceeding 2011-287, Conference Master Resources.
  2. Kuo, Hsien-Chang & Lin, Dan & Lien, Donald & Wang, Lie-Huey & Yeh, Li-Jen, 2014. "Is there an inverse U-shaped relationship between pay and performance?," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 28(C), pages 347-357.
  3. Hearn, Bruce, 2013. "The determinants of director remuneration, executive tenure and individual executive disclosure in North African IPO firms," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 162-182.

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