Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Political Accountability and Policy Experimentation: Why to Elect Left-Handed Politicians?

Contents:

Author Info

  • Tim Willems

Abstract

In an environment where voters face an inference problem on the competence level of policy makers, this paper shows how subjecting these policy makers to reelection can reduce the degree of policy experimentation to the benefit of the status quo.� This may be a reason why some notable policy experiments were implemented by non-accountable regimes (cf. Chile and China).� Whether experimentation in representative democracies is suboptimally low, depends on society's degree of risk aversion relative to that of the decision maker.� If the level of experimentation is suboptimal, taking decisions by direct democracy, or electing risk-loving politicians could improve welfare.� Interestingly, risk-lovers also seem to be overrepresented among Presidents of various countries.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.economics.ox.ac.uk/materials/papers/12641/paper647.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Oxford, Department of Economics in its series Economics Series Working Papers with number 647.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 07 Mar 2013
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:oxf:wpaper:647

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Manor Rd. Building, Oxford, OX1 3UQ
Email:
Web page: http://www.economics.ox.ac.uk/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: Policy experimentation; learning; political economy; reform; status quo bias; career concerns;

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Bandiera, Oriana & Guiso, Luigi & Prat, Andrea & Sadun, Raffaella, 2009. "Matching Firms, Managers, and Incentives," CEPR Discussion Papers 7207, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Eric Maskin & Jean Tirole, 2004. "The Politician and the Judge: Accountability in Government," Economics Working Papers 0020, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
  3. Steven Callander & Bård Harstad, 2013. "Experimentation in Federal Systems," NBER Working Papers 19601, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Chambers, Christopher P. & Echenique, Federico, 2012. "When does aggregation reduce risk aversion?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 582-595.
  5. Sharun Mukand & Dani Rodrik, 2002. "In Search of the Holy Grail: Policy Convergence, Experimentation, and Economic Performance," NBER Working Papers 9134, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Sumon Majumdar & Sharun W. Mukand, 2004. "Policy Gambles," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(4), pages 1207-1222, September.
  7. Philippe Jehiel, 1999. "Information Aggregation and Communication in Organizations," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 45(5), pages 659-669, May.
  8. Arrow, Kenneth J & Lind, Robert C, 1970. "Uncertainty and the Evaluation of Public Investment Decisions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 60(3), pages 364-78, June.
  9. Beck, Gunter W. & Wieland, Volker, 2002. "Learning and control in a changing economic environment," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 26(9-10), pages 1359-1377, August.
  10. Tim Willems, 2013. "Actively Learning by Pricing: A Model of an Experimenting Seller," Economics Series Working Papers 687, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  11. Alex Cukierman & Yossi Spiegel, 2003. "When is the median voter paradigm a reasonable guide for policy choices in a representative democracy?," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(3), pages 247-284, November.
  12. Hübler, Olaf, 2012. "Are Tall People Less Risk Averse than Others?," IZA Discussion Papers 6441, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  13. Samuelson, William & Zeckhauser, Richard, 1988. " Status Quo Bias in Decision Making," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 7-59, March.
  14. Carlo Prato & Bruno Strulovici, 2010. "Direct Democracy, Political Delegation, and Responsibility Substitution," Discussion Papers 1515, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  15. Nicola Persico & Andrew Postlewaite & Dan Silverman, 2004. "The Effect of Adolescent Experience on Labor Market Outcomes: The Case of Height," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 112(5), pages 1019-1053, October.
  16. Patrick Bolton & Christopher Harris, 1999. "Strategic Experimentation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(2), pages 349-374, March.
  17. Zwiebel, Jeffrey, 1995. "Corporate Conservatism and Relative Compensation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(1), pages 1-25, February.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oxf:wpaper:647. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Caroline Wise).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.