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The relation between changes in CEO compensation and firm performance: A Japanese/American comparison

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  • Mitsudome, Toshiaki
  • Weintrop, Joseph
  • Hwang, Lee-Seok
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    Abstract

    In this paper we compare the relations between the changes in the personal wealth of CEOs and firm performance among Japanese and American companies. Using a personal income measure imputed from annual personal income tax amounts for Japanese executives, we show that Japanese and US CEOs are rewarded for short-term changes in operating income and changes on shareholder wealth, and that the associations are similar for both groups. J. Japanese Int. Economies 22 (4) (2008) 605-619.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of the Japanese and International Economies.

    Volume (Year): 22 (2008)
    Issue (Month): 4 (December)
    Pages: 605-619

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:jjieco:v:22:y:2008:i:4:p:605-619

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    Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622903

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    Keywords: Corporate governance Executive compensation Japanese corporations;

    References

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    4. Murphy, Kevin J., 1985. "Corporate performance and managerial remuneration : An empirical analysis," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 7(1-3), pages 11-42, April.
    5. Kato, Takao, 1997. "Chief executive compensation and corporate groups in Japan: New evidence from micro data," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 15(4), pages 455-467, July.
    6. Brian J. Hall & Jeffrey B. Liebman, 1998. "Are CEOs Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 113(3), pages 653-691, August.
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    8. Jensen, M.C. & Wamer, J.B., 1988. "The Distribution Of Power Among Corporate Managers, Shareholders, And Directors," Papers, Rochester, Business - Managerial Economics Research Center 88-06, Rochester, Business - Managerial Economics Research Center.
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    14. Coughlan, Anne T. & Schmidt, Ronald M., 1985. "Executive compensation, management turnover, and firm performance : An empirical investigation," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 7(1-3), pages 43-66, April.
    15. Kato, Takao & Rockel, Mark, 1992. "Experiences, credentials, and compensation in the Japanese and U.S. managerial labor markets: Evidence from new micro data," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 30-51, March.
    16. Kato, Takao & Kubo, Katsuyuki, 2006. "CEO compensation and firm performance in Japan: Evidence from new panel data on individual CEO pay," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 1-19, March.
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    Cited by:
    1. Takuya Iwasaki & Shota Otomasa & Atsushi Shiiba & Akinobu Shuto, 2012. "Excess Executive Compensation and the Demand for Accounting Conservatism," Discussion Paper Series, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University DP2012-08, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University.
    2. Min, Byung-Seong, 2013. "Evaluation of board reforms: An examination of the appointment of outside directors," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 29(C), pages 21-43.

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