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Profitability of the Name-Your-Own-Price Channel in the Case of Risk-Averse Buyers

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  • Dmitry Shapiro

    (Belk College of Business, University of North Carolina Charlotte, Charlotte, North Carolina 28223)

Abstract

In this paper, I study profitability of the name-your-own-price channel (NYOP) in the presence of risk-averse buyers. First, I provide conditions that guarantee that for the monopolistic seller the NYOP is more profitable than the posted price. Second, I consider a more competitive framework where buyers with rejected bids have access to an alternative option. I show that if under the posted-price scenario there are unserved customers with low valuations, then NYOP is more profitable than the posted price. Finally, I study whether adding the posted-price option to the NYOP will further increase the seller's profit and show that for the decreasing absolute risk-aversion utility and a monopolistic seller it does not. In the presence of an alternative option, the answer depends on whether buyers consider the posted-price option and the alternative option to be close substitutes or not. Adding the posted-price option will increase the profit in the former case and will not in the latter.

Suggested Citation

  • Dmitry Shapiro, 2011. "Profitability of the Name-Your-Own-Price Channel in the Case of Risk-Averse Buyers," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 30(2), pages 290-304, 03-04.
    • Handle: RePEc:inm:ormksc:v:30:y:2011:i:2:p:290-304
    DOI: 10.1287/mksc.1100.0622
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    2. Jianbin Li & Qifei Wang & Hong Yan & Stuart X. Zhu, 2016. "Optimal Remanufacturing and Pricing Strategies Under Name-Your-Own-Price Auctions and Stochastic Demand," Asia-Pacific Journal of Operational Research (APJOR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 33(01), pages 1-22, February.
    3. Krämer, Florentin & Schmidt, Klaus M. & Spann, Martin & Stich, Lucas, 2017. "Delegating pricing power to customers: Pay What You Want or Name Your Own Price?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 125-140.
    4. Huang, Ching-I & Chen, Jong-Rong & Lee, Chiu-Yu, 2013. "Buyer behavior under the Best Offer mechanism: A theoretical model and empirical evidence from eBay Motors," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 11-33.
    5. Ling, Liuyi & Guo, Xiaolong & Yang, Chenchen, 2014. "Opening the online marketplace: An examination of hotel pricing and travel agency on-line distribution of rooms," Tourism Management, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 234-243.
    6. Martin Spann & Robert Zeithammer & Marco Bertini & Ernan Haruvy & Sandy D. Jap & Oded Koenigsberg & Vincent Mak & Peter Popkowski Leszczyc & Bernd Skiera & Manoj Thomas, 2018. "Beyond Posted Prices: the Past, Present, and Future of Participative Pricing Mechanisms," Customer Needs and Solutions, Springer;Institute for Sustainable Innovation and Growth (iSIG), vol. 5(1), pages 121-136, March.

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