Does it pay to be transparent? international evidence form central bank forecasts - commentary
AbstractNo abstract is available for this item.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis in its journal Review.
Volume (Year): (2002)
Issue (Month): Jul ()
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Antulio N. Bomfim & Vincent R. Reinhart, 2000. "Making news: financial market effects of Federal Reserve disclosure practices," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2000-14, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
- Bevger, H. & Haan, J. de & Eijffinger, S.C.W., 2000.
"Central Bank Independence: An Update of Theory and Evidence,"
Open Access publications from Tilburg University
urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-82768, Tilburg University.
- Berger, Helge & de Haan, Jakob & Eijffinger, Sylvester C W, 2001. " Central Bank Independence: An Update of Theory and Evidence," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(1), pages 3-40, February.
- Berger, Helge & de Haan, Jakob & Eijffinger, Sylvester C W, 2000. "Central Bank Independence: An Update of Theory and Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 2353, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Laurence Ball, 1997.
"Efficient rules for monetary policy,"
Reserve Bank of New Zealand Discussion Paper Series
G97/3, Reserve Bank of New Zealand.
- Robert J. Barro & David B. Gordon, 1984.
"Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy,"
NBER Working Papers
1079, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Barro, Robert J. & Gordon, David B., 1983. "Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 101-121.
- Calvo, Guillermo A, 1978. "On the Time Consistency of Optimal Policy in a Monetary Economy," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(6), pages 1411-28, November.
- Alan S. Blinder, 1999. "Central Banking in Theory and Practice," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262522608, June.
- Aleksandar Murdzhev & Marc Tomljanovich, 2006. "What Color is Alan Greenspan's Tie? How Central Bank Policy Announcements Have Changed Financial Markets," Eastern Economic Journal, Eastern Economic Association, vol. 32(4), pages 571-593, Fall.
- Robert S. Gazzale & Jared C Carbone, 2011. "A Shared Sense of Responsibility: Money Versus Effort Contributions in the Vountary Provision of Public Goods," Department of Economics Working Papers 2011-12, Department of Economics, Williams College.
- Kenneth N. Kuttner & Adam S. Posen, 2011.
"How Flexible Can Inflation Targeting Be and Still Work?,"
Working Paper Series
WP11-15, Peterson Institute for International Economics.
- Kenneth Kuttner & Adam Posen, 2011. "How Flexible Can Inflation Targeting Be and Still Work?," Department of Economics Working Papers 2011-10, Department of Economics, Williams College, revised Sep 2011.
- Kuttner, Kenneth & Posen, Adam, 2011. "How flexible can inflation targeting be and still work?," Discussion Papers 34, Monetary Policy Committee Unit, Bank of England.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Xiao Xiaohong) The email address of this maintainer does not seem to be valid anymore. Please ask Xiao Xiaohong to update the entry or send us the correct address.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.