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Financial innovation, macroeconomic stability and systemic crises

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Author Info

  • Prasanna Gai
  • Sujit Kapadia
  • Stephen Millard
  • Ander Perez

Abstract

We present a general equilibrium model of intermediation designed to capture some of the key features of the modern financial system. The model incorporates financial constraints and state-contingent contracts, and contains a clearly defined pecuniary externality associated with asset fire sales during periods of stress. If a sufficiently severe shock occurs during a credit expansion, this externality is capable of generating a systemic financial crisis that may be self-fulfilling. Our model suggests that financial innovation and greater macroeconomic stability may have made financial crises in developed countries less likely than in the past but potentially more severe. Copyright � Bank of England.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco in its journal Proceedings.

Volume (Year): (2006)
Issue (Month): Nov ()
Pages:

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Handle: RePEc:fip:fedfpr:y:2006:i:nov:x:17

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References

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  1. Asli Demirgüç-Kunt & Enrica Detragiache, 2005. "Cross-Country Empirical Studies of Systemic Bank Distress: A Survey," National Institute Economic Review, National Institute of Economic and Social Research, vol. 192(1), pages 68-83, April.
  2. Urban Jermann & Vincenzo Quadrini, 2007. "Financial Innovations and Macroeconomic Volatility," 2007 Meeting Papers 50, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  3. Timothy J Kehoe & David K Levine, 1993. "Debt Constrained Asset Markets," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1276, David K. Levine.
  4. Coval, Joshua & Stafford, Erik, 2007. "Asset fire sales (and purchases) in equity markets," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 86(2), pages 479-512, November.
  5. Aghion, Philippe & Bacchetta, Philippe & Banerjee, Abhijit, 2001. "Currency crises and monetary policy in an economy with credit constraints," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(7), pages 1121-1150.
  6. Prasanna Gai & Peter Kondor & Nicholas Vause, 2006. "Procyclicality, collateral values and financial stability," Bank of England working papers 304, Bank of England.
  7. Philippe Aghion & Abhijit Banerjee & Thomas Piketty, 1999. "Dualism And Macroeconomic Volatility," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 114(4), pages 1359-1397, November.
  8. Markus K. Brunnermeier & Lasse Heje Pedersen, 2007. "Market Liquidity and Funding Liquidity," NBER Working Papers 12939, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  9. Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, 2000. "Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, issue Win, pages 14-23.
  10. Hoggarth, Glenn & Reis, Ricardo & Saporta, Victoria, 2002. "Costs of banking system instability: Some empirical evidence," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 26(5), pages 825-855, May.
  11. Raghuram G. Rajan, 2005. "Has Financial Development Made the World Riskier?," Working Papers id:248, eSocialSciences.
  12. Luca Benati, 2004. "Evolving post-World War II UK economic performance," Bank of England working papers 232, Bank of England.
  13. Morris, Stephen & Shin, Hyun Song, 1998. "Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Self-Fulfilling Currency Attacks," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(3), pages 587-97, June.
  14. Guido Lorenzoni, 2008. "Inefficient Credit Booms," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 75(3), pages 809-833.
  15. Darrell Duffie & Nicolae Garleanu & Lasse Heje Pedersen, 2004. "Over-the-Counter Markets," NBER Working Papers 10816, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  16. Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, 2007. "Systemic Risk and Regulation," NBER Chapters, in: The Risks of Financial Institutions, pages 341-376 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  17. Allen, Franklin & Carletti, Elena, 2006. "Credit risk transfer and contagion," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 89-111, January.
  18. Claudio E. V. Borio, 2004. "Market distress and vanishing liquidity: anatomy and policy options," BIS Working Papers 158, Bank for International Settlements.
  19. William R. White, 2004. "Are changes in financial structure extending safety nets?," BIS Working Papers 145, Bank for International Settlements.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Marcus Miller & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 2010. "Leverage and Asset Bubbles: Averting Armageddon with Chapter 11?," NBER Working Papers 15817, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. da Silva, Marcos Soares & Divino, Jose Angelo, 2013. "The role of banking regulation in an economy under credit risk and liquidity shock," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 26(C), pages 266-281.
  3. Ilhyock Shim & Goetz von Peter, 2007. "Distress selling and asset market feedback," BIS Working Papers 229, Bank for International Settlements.
  4. Frank A.G. den Butter, 2010. "The Macroeconomics of the Credit Crisis: In Search of Externalities for Macro-Prudential Supervision," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 10-052/3, Tinbergen Institute.
  5. Mariano Beltrani & Juan Cuattromo, 2012. "Redefining Monetary Policy Limits: Towards an Expansion of its Role in Economic Development," Ensayos Económicos, Central Bank of Argentina, Economic Research Department, vol. 1(67), pages 121-168, December.
  6. David Aikman & Piergiorgio Alessandri & Bruno Eklund & Prasanna Gai & Sujit Kapadia, & Elizabeth Martin, & Nada Mora & Gabriel Sterne & Matthew Willison, 2011. "Funding Liquidity Risk in a Quantitative Model of Systemic Stability," Central Banking, Analysis, and Economic Policies Book Series, in: Rodrigo Alfaro (ed.), Financial Stability, Monetary Policy, and Central Banking, edition 1, volume 15, chapter 12, pages 371-410 Central Bank of Chile.
  7. Guido Lorenzoni, 2008. "Inefficient Credit Booms," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 75(3), pages 809-833.
  8. Rasmus Kattai, 2010. "Credit risk model for the Estonian banking sector," Bank of Estonia Working Papers wp2010-01, Bank of Estonia, revised 04 Feb 2010.
  9. Piergiorgio Alessandri & Prasanna Gai & Sujit Kapadia & Nada Mora & Claus Puhr, 2009. "Towards a Framework for Quantifying Systemic Stability," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 5(3), pages 47-81, September.
  10. David Mayes, 2011. "The future of financial markets: financial crisis avoidance," Empirica, Springer, vol. 38(1), pages 77-101, February.
  11. Bretschger, Lucas & Kappel, Vivien & Werner, Therese, 2012. "Market concentration and the likelihood of financial crises," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 36(12), pages 3336-3345.
  12. Mirakhor, Abbas & Krichene, Noureddine, 2009. "The Recent Crisis: Lessons for Islamic Finance," MPRA Paper 56022, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  13. Kara, Gazi, 2013. "Systemic Risk, International Regulation, and the Limits of Coordination," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2013-87, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).

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