Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Manipulation in elections with uncertain preferences

Contents:

Author Info

  • McLennan, Andrew

Abstract

A decision scheme (Gibbard, 1977) maps profiles of strict preferences over a set of social alternatives to lotteries over the social alternatives. A decision scheme is weakly strategy-proof if it is never possible for a voter to increase expected utility (for some vNM utility function consistent with her ordinal preferences) by misrepresenting her preferences when her belief about the preferences of other voters is generated by a model in which the other voters are i.i.d. draws from a distribution over possible preferences. We show that if there are at least three alternatives, a decision scheme is necessarily a random dictatorship if it is weakly strategy-proof, never assigns positive probability to Pareto dominated alternatives, and is anonymous in the sense of being unaffected by permutations of the components of the profile.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304406811000176
Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Mathematical Economics.

Volume (Year): 47 (2011)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Pages: 370-375

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:47:y:2011:i:3:p:370-375

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jmateco

Related research

Keywords: Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem; Strategy-proof; Manipulation; Voting; Elections;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Roth, Alvin E. & Sotomayor, Marilda, 1992. "Two-sided matching," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, Elsevier, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 16, pages 485-541 Elsevier.
  2. Maskin, Eric, 1999. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 66(1), pages 23-38, January.
  3. Roger B. Myerson, 1994. "Extended Poisson Games and the Condorcet Jury Theorem," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1103, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  4. Satterthwaite, Mark Allen, 1975. "Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 187-217, April.
  5. Roger B. Myerson, 1998. "Population uncertainty and Poisson games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 27(3), pages 375-392.
  6. Myerson, Roger B., 2002. "Comparison of Scoring Rules in Poisson Voting Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 103(1), pages 219-251, March.
  7. Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
  8. Gibbard, Allan, 1977. "Manipulation of Schemes That Mix Voting with Chance," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 45(3), pages 665-81, April.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Matías Núñez, 2014. "The strategic sincerity of Approval voting," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 56(1), pages 157-189, May.
  2. Jean-François Laslier & Jörgen Weibull, 2008. "Committee decisions: Optimality and Equilibrium," Working Papers, HAL halshs-00121741, HAL.
  3. Francesco De Sinopoli & Claudia Meroni & Carlos Pimienta, 2014. "Strategic Stability in Poisson Games," Discussion Papers, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales 2014-09, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:47:y:2011:i:3:p:370-375. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.