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Teacher evaluation for accountability and growth: Should policy treat them as complements or substitutes?

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  • Liebowitz, David D.

Abstract

U.S. state and local policy frameworks treat teacher evaluation as balancing two aims: accountability and skill development. I develop a model of teacher effectiveness and detail the conditions that determine joint-aim appraisal systems’ contribution to teacher productivity. I then simulate the long-term effects of a set of teacher evaluation policies. Policies that treat evaluation for accountability and evaluation for growth as substitutes outperform those that treat them as complements. I conclude that an optimal teacher evaluation policy would impose accountability on teachers performing below a defined level and above which teachers would be subject to no accountability pressure but would receive intensive instructional supports.

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  • Liebowitz, David D., 2021. "Teacher evaluation for accountability and growth: Should policy treat them as complements or substitutes?," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:labeco:v:71:y:2021:i:c:s0927537121000592
    DOI: 10.1016/j.labeco.2021.102024
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Education policy; Teacher evaluation; Labor contracts; Personnel management; Simulation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • I21 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Analysis of Education
    • I28 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Government Policy
    • J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
    • J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
    • J45 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Public Sector Labor Markets

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