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Balancing incentives in the compensation contracts of nonprofit hospital CEOs

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  • Preyra, Colin
  • Pink, George
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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Health Economics.

    Volume (Year): 20 (2001)
    Issue (Month): 4 (July)
    Pages: 509-525

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:jhecon:v:20:y:2001:i:4:p:509-525

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    Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505560

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    1. Gunderson, M. & Riddell, W.C., 1995. "Public and Private Sector Wages: A Comparison," Papers, Queen's at Kingston - School of Policy Studies 95-01, Queen's at Kingston - School of Policy Studies.
    2. Clarkson, Kenneth W, 1972. "Some Implications of Property Rights in Hospital Management," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 15(2), pages 363-84, October.
    3. Mankiw, N Gregory, 1985. "Consumer Durables and the Real Interest Rate," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 67(3), pages 353-62, August.
    4. Sherwin Rosen, 1982. "Authority, Control, and the Distribution of Earnings," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(2), pages 311-323, Autumn.
    5. Rajesh K. Aggarwal & Andrew A. Samwick, 1999. "The Other Side of the Trade-off: The Impact of Risk on Executive Compensation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(1), pages 65-105, February.
    6. Richard Blundell & Thomas M. Stoker, 1994. "Consumption and the timing of income risk," IFS Working Papers, Institute for Fiscal Studies W94/09, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
    7. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    8. Fama, Eugene F & Jensen, Michael C, 1983. "Separation of Ownership and Control," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 301-25, June.
    9. Sydney Ludvigson & Christina H. Paxson, 1999. "Approximation Bias in Linearized Euler Equations," NBER Technical Working Papers 0236, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Pauly, Mark V, 1987. "Nonprofit Firms in Medical Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 77(2), pages 257-62, May.
    11. Zeldes, Stephen P, 1989. "Optimal Consumption with Stochastic Income: Deviations from Certainty Equivalence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 104(2), pages 275-98, May.
    12. Fama, Eugene F & Jensen, Michael C, 1983. "Agency Problems and Residual Claims," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 327-49, June.
    13. Hirth, Richard A., 1999. "Consumer information and competition between nonprofit and for-profit nursing homes," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 219-240, April.
    14. Petersen, Trond, 1991. "Reward Systems and the Distribution of Wages," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(0), pages 130-58, Special I.
    15. Mankiw, N. Gregory, 1981. "The permanent income hypothesis and the real interest rate," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 7(4), pages 307-311.
    16. Palumbo, Michael G, 1999. "Uncertain Medical Expenses and Precautionary Saving Near the End of the Life Cycle," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 66(2), pages 395-421, April.
    17. Newhouse, Joseph P, 1970. "Toward a Theory of Nonprofit Institutions: An Economic Model of a Hospital," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 60(1), pages 64-74, March.
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    Cited by:
    1. Masaki Nakabayashi, 2005. "Hedonic prices and multidimensional incentives," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 05-32-Rev.2, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP), revised May 2006.
    2. Cardinaels, Eddy, 2009. "Governance in non-for-profit hospitals: Effects of board members' remuneration and expertise on CEO compensation," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 93(1), pages 64-75, November.
    3. Kathleen Carey & Avi Dor, 2008. "Expense preference behavior and management “outsourcing”: a comparison of adopters and non-adopters of contract management in U.S. hospitals," Journal of Productivity Analysis, Springer, Springer, vol. 29(1), pages 61-75, February.
    4. Michael Kopel & Marco A. Marini, 2012. "Optimal Compensation Structure in Consumer Cooperatives under Mixed Oligopoly," DIS Technical Reports, Department of Computer, Control and Management Engineering, Universita' degli Studi di Roma "La Sapienza" 2012-06, Department of Computer, Control and Management Engineering, Universita' degli Studi di Roma "La Sapienza".
    5. Masaki Nakabayashi, 2005. "Hedonic prices and multitask incentives," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 05-32, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP).
    6. Michael Kopel & Marco Marini, 2013. "Strategic Delegation In Consumer Cooperatives Under Mixed Oligopoly," Working Papers, University of Urbino Carlo Bo, Department of Economics, Society & Politics - Scientific Committee - L. Stefanini & G. Travaglini 1306, University of Urbino Carlo Bo, Department of Economics, Society & Politics - Scientific Committee - L. Stefanini & G. Travaglini, revised 2013.
    7. C. Du Bois & R. Caers & M. Jegers & C. Schepers & S. De Gieter & R. Pepermans, 2004. "Agency problems and unrelated business income of non-profit organizations: an empirical analysis," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 36(20), pages 2317-2326.
    8. Gregory E. Goering, 2007. "The strategic use of managerial incentives in a non-profit firm mixed duopoly," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 28(2), pages 83-91.
    9. Monica Auteri & Richard Wagner, 2007. "The Organizational Architecture of Nonprofit Governance: Economic Calculation Within an Ecology of Enterprises," Public Organization Review, Springer, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 57-68, March.

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