Hedonic prices and multitask incentives
AbstractMany human tasks are multidimensional. Hence Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) concluded that a ghigh-poweredh incentive cannot work unless all dimensions of the task are observable in the firm. However, as this study shows, if the firm can observe the price vector of its product in the market, distinguish each dimension of the price vector, and connect the information with signals from workers in the firm, then the multitask ghighpoweredh incentive becomes manageable. Product differentiation with committed quality satisfies this condition, which has been practiced by Japanese, but not by Western, manufacturing for a century.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP) in its series Discussion Papers in Economics and Business with number 05-32.
Length: 30 pages
Date of creation: Dec 2005
Date of revision:
multitask incentive; high-powered incentive; hedonic price; contract theory; Japanese manufacturing.;
Other versions of this item:
- L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- N65 - Economic History - - Manufacturing and Construction - - - Asia including Middle East
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