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Family firm heterogeneity and CEO compensation in Continental Europe

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  • Barontini, Roberto
  • Bozzi, Stefano

Abstract

CEO compensation in family firms is affected by certain corporate governance characteristics, such as the generational stage of the firm (founder or descendant-controlled firms), the level of family involvement on the board of directors (lone or multiple family members sitting on the board) and the family status of the CEO (family or professional CEO).

Suggested Citation

  • Barontini, Roberto & Bozzi, Stefano, 2018. "Family firm heterogeneity and CEO compensation in Continental Europe," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 1-18.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jebusi:v:97:y:2018:i:c:p:1-18
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jeconbus.2018.02.001
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