We examine the performance of firms that are controlled by founding families in Japan. We construct a new data set on founding families, which includes data on founding family ownership, family management, and generation of family senior managers. We find that about 36% of listed firms are managed by the founder or his descendant, and founding families are the largest shareholder in about 25% of listed firms. We empirically find that family firms managed by founders are traded at a premium. After the retirement of founders, the results are mixed. The performance of family firms both owned and managed by the founder's descendants is inferior to that of nonfamily firms. In contrast, the performance of family firms owned or managed by the founder's descendants is superior to that of nonfamily firms. J. Japanese Int. Economies 22 (4) (2008) 620-646.
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Volume (Year): 22 (2008) Issue (Month): 4 (December) Pages: 620-646 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
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