“Family” ownership, tunneling and earnings management: A review of the literature
AbstractIn this review article, we bring together a number of aspects of family firms that are ubiquitous in a number of institutional contexts, often as part of larger business groups. We pay particular attention to the mechanisms by which families retain control over firms, and the incentives of the families in control to expropriate other stakeholders by way of tunnelling. We examine the role of earnings management in facilitating tunnelling, and evidence about the incidence of earnings management in family firms. Our review suggests that while the literature on these aspects of family control is rich, the contexts in which the empirical exercises are undertaken are relatively few, and hence there is considerable opportunity to expand it to other contexts, in particular in the form of cross-country comparisons of the relative impact of agency conflicts and institutions on these issues.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan in its series William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series with number wp954.
Date of creation: 01 Mar 2009
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family control; group affiliation; agency problem; tunnelling; earnings management;
Other versions of this item:
- Sumon Kumar Bhaumik & Andros Gregoriou, 2010. "'Family' Ownership, Tunnelling And Earnings Management: A Review Of The Literature," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24(4), pages 705-730, 09.
- G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
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- Sumon Bhaumik & Pranab Kumar Das & Subal C. Kumbhakar, 2011. "Firm Investment & Credit Constraints in India, 1997 – 2006: A stochastic frontier approach," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan wp1010, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
- Muñoz-Bullón, Fernando & Sánchez-Bueno, Maria J., 2012. "Do family ties shape the performance consequences of diversification? Evidence from the European Union," Journal of World Business, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 47(3), pages 469-477.
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