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Business Groups and Tunneling: Evidencefrom Private Securities Offeringsby Korean Chaebols

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  • JAE-SEUNG BAEK
  • JUN-KOO KANG
  • INMOO LEE
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    Abstract

    We examine whether equity-linked private securities offerings are used as a mechanism for tunneling among firms that belong to a Korean chaebol. We find that chaebol issuers involved in intragroup deals set the offering prices to benefit their controlling shareholders. We also find that chaebol issuers (member acquirers) realize an 8.8% (5.8%) higher (lower) announcement return than do other types of issuers (acquirers) if they sell private securities at a premium to other member firms, and if the controlling shareholders receive positive net gains from equity ownership in issuers and acquirers. These results are consistent with tunneling within business groups. Copyright 2006 by The American Finance Association.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by American Finance Association in its journal The Journal of Finance.

    Volume (Year): 61 (2006)
    Issue (Month): 5 (October)
    Pages: 2415-2449

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    Handle: RePEc:bla:jfinan:v:61:y:2006:i:5:p:2415-2449

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    Cited by:
    1. Kim, Woochan & Kim, Woojin & Kwon, Kap-Sok, 2009. "Value of outside blockholder activism: Evidence from the switchers," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 15(4), pages 505-522, September.
    2. Gonenc, Halit & Hermes, Niels, 2008. "Propping: Evidence from new share issues of Turkish business group firms," Journal of Multinational Financial Management, Elsevier, vol. 18(3), pages 261-275, July.
    3. Cheung, Yan-Leung & Jing, Lihua & Lu, Tong & Rau, P. Raghavendra & Stouraitis, Aris, 2009. "Tunneling and propping up: An analysis of related party transactions by Chinese listed companies," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 372-393, June.
    4. Bae, Sung C. & Kwon, Taek Ho & Lee, Jang W., 2011. "Does corporate diversification by business groups create value? Evidence from Korean chaebols," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 19(5), pages 535-553, November.
    5. Sviatoslav Moskalev & Seung Park, 2010. "South Korean Chaebols and Value-Based Management," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 92(1), pages 49-62, March.
    6. Atanasov, Vladimir & Black, Bernard & Ciccotello, Conrad & Gyoshev, Stanley, 2010. "How does law affect finance? An examination of equity tunneling in Bulgaria," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(1), pages 155-173, April.
    7. Jiang, Guohua & Lee, Charles M.C. & Yue, Heng, 2010. "Tunneling through intercorporate loans: The China experience," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 98(1), pages 1-20, October.
    8. Lim, Youngdeok, 2011. "Tax avoidance, cost of debt and shareholder activism: Evidence from Korea," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 456-470, February.
    9. Cheung, Yan-Leung & Qi, Yuehua & Raghavendra Rau, P. & Stouraitis, Aris, 2009. "Buy high, sell low: How listed firms price asset transfers in related party transactions," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 33(5), pages 914-924, May.
    10. Dow, Sandra & McGuire, Jean, 2009. "Propping and tunneling: Empirical evidence from Japanese keiretsu," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 33(10), pages 1817-1828, October.
    11. Teodora Paligorova & Zhaoxia Xu, 2009. "Complex Ownership and Capital Structure," Working Papers 09-12, Bank of Canada.
    12. Hail, Luzi & Leuz, Christian, 2009. "Cost of capital effects and changes in growth expectations around U.S. cross-listings," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(3), pages 428-454, September.
    13. Kali, Raja & Sarkar, Jayati, 2011. "Diversification and tunneling: Evidence from Indian business groups," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(3), pages 349-367, September.
    14. Heitor Almeida & Sang Yong Park & Marti Subrahmanyam & Daniel Wolfenzon, 2009. "The Structure and Formation of Business Groups: Evidence from Korean Chaebols," NBER Working Papers 14983, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    15. Chen, Donghua & Jian, Ming & Xu, Ming, 2009. "Dividends for tunneling in a regulated economy: The case of China," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 209-223, April.

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