Are family managers agents or stewards? An exploratory study in privately held family firms
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Business Research.
Volume (Year): 60 (2007)
Issue (Month): 10 (October)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jbusres
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- Demski, Joel S. & Sappington, David, 1984. "Optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 152-171, June.
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- Lex Donaldson & James H. Davis, 1991. "Stewardship Theory or Agency Theory: CEO Governance and Shareholder Returns," Australian Journal of Management, Australian School of Business, Australian School of Business, vol. 16(1), pages 49-64, June.
- Lubatkin, Michael H. & Durand, Rodolphe & Ling, Yan, 2007. "The missing lens in family firm governance theory: A self-other typology of parental altruism," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 60(10), pages 1022-1029, October.
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