Moral Hazard and Renegotiation with Multiple Agents
AbstractThe purpose of this paper is to investigate contract renegotiation in multi-agent situations where risk averse agents negotiate a contract offer to the principal after they observed a common, unverifiable perfect signal about their actions. Renegotiation gives the agents gains from mutual insurance.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University in its series ISER Discussion Paper with number 0471.
Length: 33 pages
Date of creation: 1998
Date of revision:
MORAL HAZARD ; RISK ; CONTRACTS;
Other versions of this item:
- Ishiguro, Shingo & Itoh, Hideshi, 2001. "Moral Hazard and Renegotiation with Multiple Agents," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 68(1), pages 1-20, January.
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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- Osano, Hiroshi & Kobayashi, Mami, 2005.
"Double moral hazard and renegotiation,"
Research in Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 59(4), pages 345-364, December.
- Chrisman, James J. & Chua, Jess H. & Kellermanns, Franz W. & Chang, Erick P.C., 2007. "Are family managers agents or stewards? An exploratory study in privately held family firms," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 60(10), pages 1030-1038, October.
- Shingo Ishiguro, 2004. "Information Aggregation and Efficiency in Agency Contracts with Endogenous Externality," Econometric Society 2004 Australasian Meetings 60, Econometric Society.
- Bin R. Chen & Y. Stephen Chiu, 2013. "Interim Performance Evaluation in Contract Design," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 123, pages 665-698, 06.
- G. Bono, 2005. "Monitoring Team Production by Design," Working Papers 540, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
- Chandrasekher, Madhav, 0. "Unraveling in a repeated moral hazard model with multiple agents," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.
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