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Training and intrinsic motivation in nonprofit and for-profit organizations

Author

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  • DeVaro, Jed
  • Maxwell, Nan
  • Morita, Hodaka

Abstract

We develop a theoretical model in which for-profit and nonprofit employers compete to hire a worker who derives intrinsic motivation from the nonprofit's social mission. Using a unique data set of California establishments, we document a new empirical result that training has a higher incidence in nonprofits than in for-profits. In nonprofits, we also find evidence of lower base wages (with the wage gap increasing in skill level) and less incentive pay. We use the model to interpret the new result concerning training and the results (both here and from the prior literature) on base wages and incentive pay.

Suggested Citation

  • DeVaro, Jed & Maxwell, Nan & Morita, Hodaka, 2017. "Training and intrinsic motivation in nonprofit and for-profit organizations," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 139(C), pages 196-213.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:139:y:2017:i:c:p:196-213
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.04.005
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Joseph Lanfranchi & Mathieu Narcy, 2022. "How do prosocial motivation and performance‐related pay interact in the workplace context? Evidence from the non‐profit sector," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 75(3), pages 436-455, August.
    2. Anne Boring & Claudine Desrieux & Romain Espinosa, 2018. "Aspiring Top Civil Servants’ Distrust in the Private Sector," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 128(6), pages 1047-1087.
    3. Barigozzi, Francesca & Burani, Nadia, 2019. "Competition for talent when firms' mission matters," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 116(C), pages 128-151.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Nonprofits; Training; Incentive pay; Intrinsic motivation; Compensating differentials; Fringe benefits;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
    • L30 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - General
    • L29 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Other

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