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Information-sharing in social networks

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  • Kleinberg, Jon
  • Ligett, Katrina

Abstract

We present a new model for reasoning about the way information is shared among friends in a social network and the resulting ways in which the social network fragments. Our model formalizes the intuition that revealing personal information in social settings involves a trade-off between the benefits of sharing information with friends, and the risks that additional gossiping will propagate it to someone with whom one is not on friendly terms but who is within oneʼs community. We study the behavior of rational agents in such a situation, and we characterize the existence and computability of stable information-sharing configurations, in which agents do not have an incentive to change the set of partners with whom they share information. We analyze the implications of these stable configurations for social welfare and the resulting fragmentation of the social network.

Suggested Citation

  • Kleinberg, Jon & Ligett, Katrina, 2013. "Information-sharing in social networks," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 702-716.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:82:y:2013:i:c:p:702-716
    DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.10.002
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    Cited by:

    1. Alexey Kushnir & Alexandru Nichifor, 2014. "Targeted vs. collective information sharing in networks," ECON - Working Papers 152, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
    2. Acemoglu, Daron & Makhdoumi, Ali & Malekian, Azarakhsh & Ozdaglar, Asuman, 2017. "Privacy-constrained network formation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 255-275.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Social networks; Information propagation; Networks; Graphs;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General

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