Outside options, component efficiency, and stability
AbstractIn this paper, we introduce a component efficient value for TU games with a coalition structure which reflects the outside options of players within the same structural coalition. It is based on the idea that splitting a coalition should affect players who stay together in the same way. We show that for all TU games there is a coalition structure that is stable with respect to this value.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.
Volume (Year): 65 (2009)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836
TU game Partition function form game Outside option Splitting Coalition structure Stability;
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