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The distribution of power in governing coalitions of the German Laender

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  • Tobias Hiller

Abstract

In this article, we analyse the distribution of voting power in governing coalitions of the German Laender (states). In a first step, we use the number of votes of parties in a parliament to determine the voting power of the parties. Based on these results, we apply the -power index (Casajus, 2009) to calculate the power of parties within governing coalitions (Wiese, 2007). For this, we consider the limitations of coalition possibilities. In three scenarios, we analyse how these affect the parties' voting power.

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  • Tobias Hiller, 2013. "The distribution of power in governing coalitions of the German Laender," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 20(12), pages 1155-1159, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:apeclt:v:20:y:2013:i:12:p:1155-1159
    DOI: 10.1080/13504851.2013.797548
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    Cited by:

    1. Tobias Hiller, 2015. "The $$\chi $$ χ value and team games," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 78(4), pages 539-548, April.
    2. Tobias Hiller, 2018. "On the Stability of Couples," Games, MDPI, vol. 9(3), pages 1-10, July.

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