Majority shareholder protection by variable qualified majority rules
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal European Journal of Law and Economics.
Volume (Year): 28 (2009)
Issue (Month): 1 (August)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100264
Shapley-Shubik index; Shapley value; Reorganization; Ban of registration; Application for judical review; C71; G32; G34; G38; K10;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
- G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
- G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
- K10 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - General (Constitutional Law)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Dennis Leech, 1988.
"The Relationship Between Shareholding Concentration and Shareholder Voting Power in British Companies: A Study of the Application of Power Indices for Simple Games,"
INFORMS, vol. 34(4), pages 509-527, April.
- Leech, Dennis, 1985. "The relationshiop between Shareholding Concentration and Shareholder Voting Power in British Companies : A study of the Application of Power Indices for Simple Games," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 267, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Moshé Machover & Dan S. Felsenthal, 2001. "The Treaty of Nice and qualified majority voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 431-464.
- Dan Felsenthal & Moshé Machover, 2005. "Voting power measurement: a story of misreinvention," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 25(2), pages 485-506, December.
- Geller, Chris R. & Mustard, Jamie & Shahwan, Ranya, 2013. "Focused power: Experiments, the Shapley-Shubik power index, and focal points," Economics Discussion Papers 2013-42, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
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