On compensation schemes for data sharing within the european REACH legislation
AbstractArticle 30 of Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 concerns the sharing of data between users of a chemical substance. We study this bargaining problem by means of a special class of games in coalitional form called data games (Dehez and Tellone, 2013). For such problems, compensation schemes specify how the data owners should be compensated by the agents in needs of data. On the class of data games, the Core, the Nucleolus and the Shapley value provide relevant compensation schemes. We provide three comparable axiomatic characterizations of the set of all (additive) compensation schemes belonging to the Core, of the Nucleolus and of the Shapley value. The axioms reflects principles of various theories of justice.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by CRESE in its series Working Papers with number 2014-01.
Length: 13 pages
Date of creation: Feb 2014
Date of revision:
REACH; Data sharing problem; Core; Nucleolus; Shapley value; Pooling; Compensation; Reasonableness; Invariance to deleting non-exclusive data; Equal treatment of Equals; Invariance to enlarging the owner set; Equal concessions;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- K32 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Environmental, Health, and Safety Law
- L65 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Manufacturing - - - Chemicals; Rubber; Drugs; Biotechnology
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"Data Games : Sharing public goods with exclusion,"
Working Papers of BETA
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