Inferior players in simple games
AbstractPower indices like those of Shapley and Shubik (1954) or Banzhaf (1965) measure the distribution of power in simple games. This paper points at a deficiency shared by all established indices: players who are inferior in the sense of having to accept (almost) no share of the spoils in return for being part of a winning coalition are assigned substantial amounts of power. A strengthened version of the dummy axiom based on a formalized notion of inferior players is a possible remedy. The axiom is illustrated first in a deterministic and then a probabilistic setting. With three axioms from the Banzhaf index, it uniquely characterizes the Strict Power Index (SPI). The SPI is shown to be a special instance of a more general family of power indices based on the inferior player axiom.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal International Journal of Game Theory.
Volume (Year): 30 (2001)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Note: Received: December 1999/Final version: June 2001
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