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Solidarity in games with a coalition structure

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  • Emilio Calvo

    ()
    (ERI-CES)

  • Maria Esther Gutierrez

    ()
    (Universidad del País Vasco/E.H.U)

Abstract

A new axiomatic characterization of the two-step Shapley value (Kamijo, 2009) is presented based on a solidarity principle of the members of any union: when the game changes due to the addition or deletion of players outside the union, all members of the union will share the same gains/losses.

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File URL: http://www.uv.es/erices/RePEc/WP/2010/0810.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Valencia, ERI-CES in its series Discussion Papers in Economic Behaviour with number 0810.

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Date of creation: Jul 2010
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Handle: RePEc:dbe:wpaper:0810

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Keywords: Games with a coalition structure. Owen value. The two-step Shapley value. Solidarity.;

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  1. Calvo, Emilio & Javier Lasaga, J. & Winter, Eyal, 1996. "The principle of balanced contributions and hierarchies of cooperation," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 171-182, June.
  2. Amer, Rafael & Carreras, Francese & Gimenez, Jose Miguel, 2002. "The modified Banzhaf value for games with coalition structure: an axiomatic characterization," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 45-54, January.
  3. Hart, Sergiu & Kurz, Mordecai, 1983. "Endogenous Formation of Coalitions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 51(4), pages 1047-64, July.
  4. Winter, Eyal, 1989. "A Value for Cooperative Games with Levels Structure of Cooperation," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 18(2), pages 227-40.
  5. Vidal-Puga, Juan, 2012. "The Harsanyi paradox and the “right to talk” in bargaining among coalitions," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 64(3), pages 214-224.
  6. Levy, Anat & Mclean, Richard P., 1989. "Weighted coalition structure values," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 1(3), pages 234-249, September.
  7. Albizuri, M. Josune & Zarzuelo, Jose M., 2004. "On coalitional semivalues," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 221-243, November.
  8. Yoshio Kamijo, 2009. "A Two-Step Shapley Value For Cooperative Games With Coalition Structures," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 11(02), pages 207-214.
  9. Sprumont, Yves, 1990. "Population monotonic allocation schemes for cooperative games with transferable utility," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 2(4), pages 378-394, December.
  10. Casajus, André, 2009. "Outside options, component efficiency, and stability," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 49-61, January.
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Cited by:
  1. Juan Vidal-Puga, 2005. "The Harsanyi paradox and the 'right to talk' in bargaining among coalitions," Game Theory and Information, EconWPA 0501005, EconWPA.
  2. Béal, Sylvain & Rémila, Eric & Solal, Philippe, 2012. "Fairness and fairness for neighbors: The difference between the Myerson value and component-wise egalitarian solutions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 117(1), pages 263-267.

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