Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Balanced per capita contributions and levels structure of cooperation

Contents:

Author Info

  • Gómez-Rúa, María
  • Vidal-Puga, Juan

Abstract

We define a new value for games with levels structure. We introduce a new property in this class of games, balanced per capita contributions, which is related with others in the literature. We provide an axiomatic characterization of this value using this new property.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8208/
File Function: original version
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 8208.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 09 Apr 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:8208

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Schackstr. 4, D-80539 Munich, Germany
Phone: +49-(0)89-2180-2219
Fax: +49-(0)89-2180-3900
Web page: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: levels structure; value; balanced per capita contributions;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Hart, Sergiu & Mas-Colell, Andreu, 1989. "Potential, Value, and Consistency," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(3), pages 589-614, May.
  2. Herings, P. Jean Jacques & van der Laan, Gerard & Talman, Dolf, 2008. "The average tree solution for cycle-free graph games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 77-92, January.
  3. P. Jean-Jacques Herings & Gerard van der Laan & Dolf Talman, 2005. "The Component Fairness Solution for Cycle-free Graph Games," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 05-114/1, Tinbergen Institute.
  4. Hart, Sergiu & Kurz, Mordecai, 1983. "Endogenous Formation of Coalitions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(4), pages 1047-64, July.
  5. Winter, Eyal, 1989. "A Value for Cooperative Games with Levels Structure of Cooperation," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 18(2), pages 227-40.
  6. Calvo, Emilio & Javier Lasaga, J. & Winter, Eyal, 1996. "The principle of balanced contributions and hierarchies of cooperation," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 171-182, June.
  7. Juan Vidal-Puga, 2005. "The Harsanyi paradox and the 'right to talk' in bargaining among coalitions," Game Theory and Information 0501005, EconWPA.
  8. Sanchez S., Francisco, 1997. "Balanced Contributions Axiom in the Solution of Cooperative Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 161-168, August.
  9. Levy, Anat & Mclean, Richard P., 1989. "Weighted coalition structure values," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(3), pages 234-249, September.
  10. repec:dgr:uvatin:2005114 is not listed on IDEAS
  11. David Pérez-Castrillo & David Wettstein, . "Bidding For The Surplus: A Non-Cooperative Approach To The Shapley Value," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 461.00, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  12. Ehud Kalai & Dov Samet, 1983. "On Weighted Shapley Values," Discussion Papers 602, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  13. E. Calvo & Juan Carlos Santos, 2000. "Weighted weak semivalues," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 29(1), pages 1-9.
  14. Gómez-Rúa, María & Vidal-Puga, Juan, 2010. "The axiomatic approach to three values in games with coalition structure," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 207(2), pages 795-806, December.
  15. Juan Vidal-Puga, 2003. "Implementation of the levels structure value," Game Theory and Information 0303006, EconWPA.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Gómez-Rúa, María & Vidal-Puga, Juan, 2010. "The axiomatic approach to three values in games with coalition structure," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 207(2), pages 795-806, December.
  2. Vidal-Puga, Juan, 2012. "The Harsanyi paradox and the “right to talk” in bargaining among coalitions," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 64(3), pages 214-224.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:8208. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ekkehart Schlicht).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.