Fairness and fairness for neighbors: The difference between the Myerson value and component-wise egalitarian solutions
AbstractWe replace the axiom of fairness used in the characterization of the Myerson value (Myerson, 1977) by fairness for neighbors in order to characterize the component-wise egalitarian solution. When a link is broken, fairness states that the two players incident to the link should be affected similarly while fairness for neighbors states that a player incident to the link and any of his other neighbors should be affected similarly. Fairness for neighbors is also used to characterize the component-wise egalitarian surplus solution and a two-step egalitarian surplus solution. These results highlight that egalitarian and marginalistic allocation rules can be obtained by applying the same equal gain/loss property to different types of players.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.
Volume (Year): 117 (2012)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet
Myerson value; Component-wise egalitarian solutions; Fairness; Fairness for neighbors; Two-step value;
Other versions of this item:
- Béal, Sylvain & Rémila, Eric & Solal, Philippe, 2012. "Fairness and fairness for neighbors: the difference between the Myerson value and component-wise egalitarian solutions," MPRA Paper 36857, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
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