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Two efficient values of cooperative games with graph structure based on $$\tau $$ τ -values

Author

Listed:
  • Guang Zhang

    (Shanghai University)

  • Erfang Shan

    (Shanghai University)

  • Liying Kang

    (Shanghai University)

  • Yanxia Dong

    (School of Statistics and Information, Shanghai University of International Business and Economics)

Abstract

The paper is devoted to value concepts for cooperative games with a communication structure represented by a graph. Under assumptions that the players partition themselves into ‘components’ before realizing cooperation and the worth of the grand coalition not less than the sum of the worths of all components, the fair distribution of surplus solution and the two-step $$\tau $$ τ -value are introduced as two efficient values for such games, each of which is an extension of the graph $$\tau $$ τ -value. For the two efficient values, we discuss their special properties and we provide their axiomatic characterizations in views of those properties. By analysing an example applied to the two values, we conclude that the fair distribution of surplus solution allocates more surplus to the bigger coalitions and favors the powerful players, while the two-step $$\tau $$ τ -value benefits the vulnerable groups and inspires to form small coalitions.

Suggested Citation

  • Guang Zhang & Erfang Shan & Liying Kang & Yanxia Dong, 2017. "Two efficient values of cooperative games with graph structure based on $$\tau $$ τ -values," Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, Springer, vol. 34(2), pages 462-482, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:jcomop:v:34:y:2017:i:2:d:10.1007_s10878-016-0081-1
    DOI: 10.1007/s10878-016-0081-1
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Sylvain Béal & Anna Khmelnitskaya & Philippe Solal, 2018. "Two-step values for games with two-level communication structure," Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, Springer, vol. 35(2), pages 563-587, February.
    2. Sylvain Béal & André Casajus & Frank Huettner, 2018. "Efficient extensions of communication values," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 264(1), pages 41-56, May.
    3. Sylvain Béal & Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal, 2022. "Allocation rules for cooperative games with restricted communication and a priori unions based on the Myerson value and the average tree solution," Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, Springer, vol. 43(4), pages 818-849, May.

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