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A comparison of standard multi-unit auctions with synergies

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  • Albano, Gian Luigi
  • Germano, Fabrizio
  • Lovo, Stefano

Abstract

In an example with two objects and four bidders, some of which have superadditive values, we characterize the equilibria of a simultaneous ascending auction and compare the revenue and efficiency generated with ones generated by the sequential, the one-shot simultaneous, and the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves auctions.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.

Volume (Year): 71 (2001)
Issue (Month): 1 (April)
Pages: 55-60

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Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:71:y:2001:i:1:p:55-60

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References

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  1. Robert W. Rosenthal & Ruqu Wang, 1995. "Simultaneous Auctions with Synergies and Common Values," Papers 0060, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
  2. Peter Cramton, 1998. "Ascending Auctions," Papers of Peter Cramton 98eer, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 28 Jul 1998.
  3. Krishna, V. & Rosenthal, R.W., 1995. "Simultaneous Auctions with Synergies," Papers 04-95-06, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.
  4. Peter Cramton, 1997. "The FCC Spectrum Auctions: An Early Assessment," Papers of Peter Cramton 97jemsfcc, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 12 Jul 1998.
  5. Paul Milgrom, . "Putting Auction Theory to Work: The Simultaneous Ascending Auction," Working Papers 98002, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
  6. Branco, Fernando, 1997. "Sequential auctions with synergies: An example," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 159-163, February.
  7. R. Preston McAfee & John McMillan, 1996. "Analyzing the Airwaves Auction," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 10(1), pages 159-175, Winter.
  8. Vijay Krishna & Motty Perry, 1997. "Efficient Mechanism Design," Game Theory and Information 9703010, EconWPA, revised 28 Apr 1998.
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Cited by:
  1. Dakshina G. De Silva & Anuruddha Kankanamge & Georgia Kosmopoulou, 2005. "The Impact Of Change In Auction Format On Bidding Behavior," Microeconomics 0512009, EconWPA.
  2. Chernomaz, Kirill & Levin, Dan, 2012. "Efficiency and synergy in a multi-unit auction with and without package bidding: An experimental study," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 611-635.
  3. LOVO, Stefano & ALBANO, Gian Luigi & GERMANO, Fabrizio, 2002. "On some collusive and signaling equilibria in ascending auctions for multiple objects," Les Cahiers de Recherche 765, HEC Paris.
  4. Zheng, Charles Zhoucheng, 2006. "Jump Bidding and Overconcentration in Decentralized Simultaneous Ascending Auctions," Staff General Research Papers 12698, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  5. De Silva, Dakshina G. & Kosmopoulou, Georgia & Pagel, Beatrice & Peeters, Ronald, 2012. "The impact of timing on bidding behavior in procurement auctions of contracts with private costs," DICE Discussion Papers 54, Heinrich‐Heine‐Universität Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
  6. Lunander, Anders & Lundberg, Sofia, 2009. "Do Combinatorial Procurement Auctions Lower Cost? - An Empirical Analysis of Public Procurement of Multiple Contracts," UmeÃ¥ Economic Studies 776, Umeå University, Department of Economics, revised 16 Sep 2009.
  7. Gian Albano & Fabrizio Germano & Stefano Lovo, 2006. "Retaliatory Equilibria in a Japanese Ascending Auction for Multiple Objects," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 10(1), pages 1-8, April.

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