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Signal jamming in a sequential auction

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  • Ding, Wei
  • Jeitschko, Thomas D.
  • Wolfstetter, Elmar G.

Abstract

In a sequence of first-price auctions with stable private values bidders strategically conceal their private information until the last auction. We characterize equilibrium bidding and explore how such signal jamming affects the dynamics of equilibrium prices.

Suggested Citation

  • Ding, Wei & Jeitschko, Thomas D. & Wolfstetter, Elmar G., 2010. "Signal jamming in a sequential auction," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 108(1), pages 58-61, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:108:y:2010:i:1:p:58-61
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Thomas D. Jeitschko & Elmar Wolfstetter, 2002. "Scale Economies and the Dynamics of Recurring Auctions," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 40(3), pages 403-414, July.
    2. Haile, Philip A., 2000. "Partial Pooling at the Reserve Price in Auctions with Resale Opportunities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 231-248, November.
    3. Jacob Rubinstein & Elmar Wolfstetter & Michael Landsberger & Shmuel Zamir, 2001. "First-price auctions when the ranking of valuations is common knowledge," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 6(3), pages 461-480.
    4. Jeitschko, Thomas D., 1999. "Equilibrium price paths in sequential auctions with stochastic supply," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 67-72, July.
    5. Gale Ian L. & Hausch Donald B., 1994. "Bottom-Fishing and Declining Prices in Sequential Auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 318-331, November.
    6. Philippe Février, 2003. "He who must not be named," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 8(1), pages 99-119, August.
    7. Johannes Münster, 2009. "Repeated Contests with Asymmetric Information," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 11(1), pages 89-118, February.
    8. McAfee R. Preston & Vincent Daniel, 1993. "The Declining Price Anomaly," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 191-212, June.
    9. Keith Waehrer, 1999. "The ratchet effect and bargaining power in a two-stage model of competitive bidding," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 13(1), pages 171-181.
    10. Caillaud, Bernard & Mezzetti, Claudio, 2004. "Equilibrium reserve prices in sequential ascending auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 117(1), pages 78-95, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Helmuts Āzacis & Péter Vida, 2015. "Collusive communication schemes in a first-price auction," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 58(1), pages 125-160, January.
    2. Timothy N. Cason & Karthik N. Kannan & Ralph Siebert, 2011. "An Experimental Study of Information Revelation Policies in Sequential Auctions," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 57(4), pages 667-688, April.
    3. Boudreau, James W. & Shunda, Nicholas, 2016. "Sequential auctions with budget constraints: Evidence from fantasy basketball auction drafts," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 62(C), pages 8-22.
    4. Helmuts Āzacis, 2020. "Information disclosure by a seller in sequential first-price auctions," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 49(2), pages 411-444, June.
    5. Emmanuel LORENZON, 2020. "Uninformed Bidding in Sequential Auctions," Bordeaux Economics Working Papers 2020-20, Bordeaux School of Economics (BSE).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Auctions Signaling Price competition;

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection

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