Global analysis of an expectations augmented evolutionary dynamics
AbstractWe consider a deterministic evolutionary model where players form expectations about future play. Players are not fully rational and have expectations that change over time in response to current payoffs and feedback from the past. We provide a complete characterization of the qualitative dynamics so induced for a two strategy population game, and relate our findings to standard evolutionary dynamics and equilibrium selection when agents have rational forward looking expectations.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control.
Volume (Year): 32 (2008)
Issue (Month): 12 (December)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jedc
Evolutionary games Dynamic systems Bounded rationality;
Other versions of this item:
- Massimiliano Landi, 2007. "Global Analysis of an Expectations Augmented Evolutionary Dynamics," Development Economics Working Papers 22463, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research.
- Angelo Antoci & Antonio Gay & Massimiliano Landi & Pier Luigi Sacco, 2007. "Global Analysis of an Expectations Augmented Evolutionary Dynamics," Working Papers 25-2007, Singapore Management University, School of Economics.
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
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