Un effet externe positif à l'embauche. L'amélioration de la connaissance de la qualité des travailleurs
AbstractIn this paper, we develop a model in which hiring of unexperienced workers has a public good characteristic in revealing information on workers quality. We analyze the macroeconomic consequences of a microeconomics phenomenon : The job matching. In this framework, we show that a decentralized hiring process of unexperienced workers is suboptimal in regards to firms joint profits. A public hiring policy increases joint profits and, under some conditions, also increases employment. Such a public policy may be seen as a reduction of social charges on low wages.Classification JEL : H41, J23, J68
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Presses de Sciences-Po in its journal Revue économique.
Volume (Year): 55 (2004)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
- J23 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Labor Demand
- J68 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Public Policy
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