Deterrence in Rank-Order Tournaments
AbstractIn a tournament competitors may cheat to gain an advantage. This paper considers the problem of deterrence and finds that tournaments reflect special circumstances that are not present in a traditional model of law enforcement. The traditional model considers sanctions and monitoring as the instruments of deterrence. In a tournament the prize structure plays a critical role in determining both the costs and benefits to cheating. We consider ways in which the prize structure can be manipulated in order to reduce monitoring costs.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by De Gruyter in its journal Review of Law & Economics.
Volume (Year): 5 (2009)
Issue (Month): 1 (December)
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Other versions of this item:
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
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