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The Economics of doping

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  • Berentsen, Aleksander

Abstract

This paper considers a strategic game in which two players, with unequal prospects of winning the game, decide simultaneously and secretly to use performance-enhancing drugs before they compete. In the mixed strategy equilibrium, the favorite player is more likely to take these drugs than is the underdog, yet, for some parameter values, he is less likely to win the game with doping opportunities than without. The paper then analyzes the anti-doping regulations adopted by the International Olympic Committee, comparing its rules with a ranking-based sanction scheme. Two results emerge from this comparison: First, while IOC regulations cannot satisfy participation and incentive compatibility constraints and implement the no-doping equilibrium in all circumstances, a more effective ranking-based sanction scheme with these properties exists. Second, ranking-based punishment schemes are less costly to implement than are IOC regulations because fewer tests are needed to attain the no-doping equilibrium.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 37322.

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Date of creation: 2002
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:37322

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Keywords: Doping; Doping Regulation; Contests; Tournaments;

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References

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  1. Dixit, Avinash K, 1987. "Strategic Behavior in Contests," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 891-98, December.
  2. Rosen, Sherwin, 1986. "Prizes and Incentives in Elimination Tournaments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(4), pages 701-15, September.
  3. Nitzan, Shmuel, 1994. "Modelling rent-seeking contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 41-60, May.
  4. Clark, Derek J. & Riis, Christian, 1998. "Influence and the discretionary allocation of several prizes," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 605-625, November.
  5. Bird, Edward J. & Wagner, Gert G., 1997. "Sport as a Common Property Resource: A Solution to the Dilemmas of Doping," EconStor Open Access Articles, ZBW - German National Library of Economics, pages 749-766.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Aleksander Berentsen & Yvan Lengwiler, . "Fraudulent Accounting and Other Doping Games," IEW - Working Papers 175, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
  2. Rebeggiani, Luca & Tondani, David, 2006. "Organisational Forms in Professional Cycling - Efficiency Issues of the UCI Pro Tour," Hannover Economic Papers (HEP) dp-345, Leibniz Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät.
  3. Krakel, Matthias, 2007. "Doping and cheating in contest-like situations," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(4), pages 988-1006, December.
  4. Maria Arbatskaya & Hugo Mialon, 2010. "Multi-activity contests," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 43(1), pages 23-43, April.
  5. Tom Coupe & Olivier Gergaud, 2011. "Suspicious Blood and Performance in the 2010 Tour de France," Discussion Papers 43, Kyiv School of Economics.
  6. Kräkel, Matthias, 2006. "Doping and Cheating in Contest-Like Situations," IZA Discussion Papers 2059, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  7. Humphreys, Brad R. & Ruseski, Jane E., 2011. "Socio-economic determinants of adolescent use of performance enhancing drugs: Evidence from the YRBSS," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 208-216, April.
  8. Aleksander Berentsen & Esther Brügger & Simon Lörtscher, . "On Cheating and Whistle-Blowing," IEW - Working Papers 153, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
  9. Daniel Mueller, 2013. "The Doping Threshold in Sport Contests," Working papers 2013/05, Faculty of Business and Economics - University of Basel.
  10. Philip A. Curry & Steeve Mongrain, 2007. "Deterrence in Rank-Order Tournaments," Discussion Papers dp07-04, Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University.
  11. Matthias Kräkel, 2005. "Doping in Contest-Like Situations," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse14_2005, University of Bonn, Germany.
  12. Berentsen, Aleksander & Bruegger, Esther & Loertscher, Simon, 2008. "On cheating, doping and whistleblowing," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 415-436, June.
  13. Konrad, Kai A., 2005. "Tournaments and Multiple Productive Inputs: The Case of Performance Enhancing Drugs," IZA Discussion Papers 1844, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  14. Buechel, Berno & Emrich, Eike & Pohlkamp, Stefanie, 2013. "Nobody's innocent: the role of customers in the doping dilemma," MPRA Paper 44627, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  15. Nicolas Eber, 2011. "Fair play in contests," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 103(3), pages 253-270, July.

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