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Abstract

This paper considers a strategic game in which two players, with unequal prospects of winning the game, decide simultaneously and secretly to use performance-enhancing drugs before they compete. In the mixed strategy equilibrium, the favorite player is more likely to take these drugs than is the underdog, yet, for some parameter values, he is less likely to win the game with doping opportunities than without. The paper then analyzes the anti-doping regulations adopted by the International Olympic Committee, comparing its rules with a ranking-based sanction scheme. Two results emerge from this comparison: First, while IOC regulations cannot satisfy participation and incentive compatibility constraints and implement the no-doping equilibrium in all circumstances, a more effective ranking-based sanction scheme with these properties exists. Second, ranking-based punishment schemes are less costly to implement than are IOC regulations because fewer tests are needed to attain the no-doping equilibrium.

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V97-44T5073-2/2/6528a7e8e43098757011aa862e0afbea
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Journal of Political Economy.

Volume (Year): 18 (2002)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
Pages: 109-127

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Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:18:y:2002:i:1:p:109-127

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505544

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Find related papers by JEL classification:

• D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
• D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation
• C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

References

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1. Clark, Derek J. & Riis, Christian, 1998. "Influence and the discretionary allocation of several prizes," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 605-625, November.
2. Bird, Edward J. & Wagner, Gert G., 1997. "Sport as a Common Property Resource: A Solution to the Dilemmas of Doping," EconStor Open Access Articles, ZBW - German National Library of Economics.
3. Sherwin Rosen, 1985. "Prizes and Incentives in Elimination Tournaments," NBER Working Papers 1668, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
   
   • Rosen, Sherwin, 1986. "Prizes and Incentives in Elimination Tournaments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(4), pages 701-15, September.
4. Dixit, Avinash K, 1987. "Strategic Behavior in Contests," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 891-98, December.
5. Nitzan, Shmuel, 1994. "Modelling rent-seeking contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 41-60, May.

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Cited by:

1. Rebeggiani, Luca & Tondani, David, 2006. "Organisational Forms in Professional Cycling - Efficiency Issues of the UCI Pro Tour," Diskussionspapiere der Wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Fakultät der Leibniz Universität Hannover dp-345, Leibniz Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät.
2. Philip A. Curry & Steeve Mongrain, 2009. "Deterrence in Rank-Order Tournaments," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 5(1), pages 30.
   
   • Philip A. Curry & Steeve Mongrain, 2007. "Deterrence in Rank-Order Tournaments," Discussion Papers dp07-04, Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University.
3. Konrad, Kai A., 2005. "Tournaments and Multiple Productive Inputs: The Case of Performance Enhancing Drugs," IZA Discussion Papers 1844, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
4. Aleksander Berentsen & Yvan Lengwiler, . "Fraudulent Accounting and Other Doping Games," IEW - Working Papers 175, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
   
   • Aleksander Berentsen & Yvan Lengwiler, 2004. "Fraudulent Accounting and Other Doping Games," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 160(3), pages 402-, September.
5. Tom Coupe & Olivier Gergaud, 2011. "Suspicious Blood and Performance in the 2010 Tour de France," Discussion Papers 43, Kyiv School of Economics.
6. Berentsen, Aleksander & Bruegger, Esther & Loertscher, Simon, 2008. "On cheating, doping and whistleblowing," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 415-436, June.
7. Matthias Kräkel, 2005. "Doping in Contest-Like Situations," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse14_2005, University of Bonn, Germany.
   
   • Kräkel, Matthias, 2005. "Doping in Contest-Like Situations," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 46, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
8. Kräkel, Matthias, 2006. "Doping and Cheating in Contest-Like Situations," IZA Discussion Papers 2059, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
9. Humphreys, Brad R. & Ruseski, Jane E., 2011. "Socio-economic determinants of adolescent use of performance enhancing drugs: Evidence from the YRBSS," The Journal of Socio-Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 208-216, April.
10. Aleksander Berentsen & Esther Brügger & Simon Lörtscher, 2003. "On Cheating and Whistle-Blowing," Diskussionsschriften dp0302, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
    
    • Aleksander Berentsen & Esther Brügger & Simon Lörtscher, . "On Cheating and Whistle-Blowing," IEW - Working Papers 153, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
11. Nicolas Eber, 2011. "Fair play in contests," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 103(3), pages 253-270, July.
12. Krakel, Matthias, 2007. "Doping and cheating in contest-like situations," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(4), pages 988-1006, December.
13. Maria Arbatskaya & Hugo Mialon, 2010. "Multi-activity contests," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 43(1), pages 23-43, April.

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