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Institutions, Property Rights, and Economic Development in Historical Perspective

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  • Luis Angeles

Abstract

Institutions, and more specifically private property rights, have come to be seen as a major determinant of long-run economic develop- ment. We evaluate the case for property rights as an explanatory factor of the Industrial Revolution and derive some lessons for the analysis of developing countries today. We pay particular attention to the role of property rights in the accumulation of physical capital and the pro- duction of new ideas. The evidence that we review from the economic history literature does not support the institutional thesis.

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/j.1467-6435.2011.00500.x
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Article provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Kyklos.

Volume (Year): 64 (2011)
Issue (Month): 2 (05)
Pages: 157-177

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Handle: RePEc:bla:kyklos:v:64:y:2011:i:2:p:157-177

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References

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  1. Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, 2009. "This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 8973.
  2. James Conklin, 1998. "The Theory of Sovereign Debt and Spain under Philip II," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(3), pages 483-513, June.
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  4. Angeles, Luis, 2010. "Institutions and Economic Development. New tests and new doubts," SIRE Discussion Papers 2010-75, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
  5. Rodrik, Dani & Subramanian, Arvind & Trebbi, Francesco, 2002. "Institutions Rule: The Primacy of Institutions Over Geography and Integration in Economic Development," CEPR Discussion Papers 3643, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  6. Parello, Carmelo Pierpaolo, 2008. "A north-south model of intellectual property rights protection and skill accumulation," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(1-2), pages 253-281, February.
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  8. Abhijit Banerjee & Lakshmi Iyer, 2010. "History Institutions and Economic Performance: The Legacy of Colonial Land Tenure Systems in India," Working Papers id:2811, eSocialSciences.
  9. Elhanan Helpman, 1992. "Innovation, Imitation, and Intellectual Property Rights," NBER Working Papers 4081, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  10. Mauricio Drelichman & Joachim Voth, 2011. "Serial defaults, serial profits: Returns to sovereign lending in Habsburg Spain, 1566-1600," Economics Working Papers 1262, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
  11. Petra Moser, 2003. "How Do Patent Laws Influence Innovation? Evidence from Nineteenth-Century World Fairs," NBER Working Papers 9909, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  12. Douglass C. North, 2005. "Introduction to Understanding the Process of Economic Change
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  13. Angeles, Luis & Neanidis, Kyriakos C., 2009. "Aid effectiveness: the role of the local elite," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(1), pages 120-134, September.
  14. Moser, Petra, 2004. "Determinants of Innovation Evidence from 19th Century World Fairs," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 64(02), pages 548-552, June.
  15. Romer, Paul M, 1990. "Endogenous Technological Change," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(5), pages S71-102, October.
  16. Angeles Luis, 2005. "Should Developing Countries Strengthen their Intellectual Property Rights?," The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, De Gruyter, vol. 5(1), pages 1-25, November.
  17. Stephen Knack & Philip Keefer, 1995. "Institutions And Economic Performance: Cross-Country Tests Using Alternative Institutional Measures," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 7(3), pages 207-227, November.
  18. Luis Angeles, 2005. "Income Inequality and Colonialism," The School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 0543, Economics, The University of Manchester.
  19. Lai, Edwin L. -C. & Qiu, Larry D., 2003. "The North's intellectual property rights standard for the South?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 183-209, January.
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  28. Quinn, Stephen, 2001. "The Glorious Revolution'S Effect On English Private Finance: A Microhistory, 1680 1705," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 61(03), pages 593-615, September.
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Cited by:
  1. Magdalena Owczarczuk, 2013. "Property Rights as a Factor of Foreign Direct Investment. The Case of Poland," Oeconomia Copernicana, Polskie Towarzystwo Ekonomiczne Oddzial w Toruniu, Wydzial Nauk Ekonomicznych i Zarzadzania UMK, vol. 2, pages 97-116.
  2. Luis Angeles, . "On the causes of the African Slave Trade," Working Papers 2012_15, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow.
  3. Enrico Colombatto, 2012. "A theory of institutional legitimacy," ICER Working Papers 05-2012, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research.

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