Colonialism, Elite Formation and Corruption
AbstractThis paper argues that corruption in developing countries has deep historical roots; going all the way back to the characteristics of their colonial experience. The degree of European settlement during colonial times is used to di¤erentiate between types of colonial experience, and is found to be a powerful explanatory factor of present-day corruption levels. The relationship is non-linear, as higher levels of European settlement resulted in more powerful elites (and more corruption) only as long as Europeans remained a minority group in the total population.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Economics, The Univeristy of Manchester in its series Centre for Growth and Business Cycle Research Discussion Paper Series with number 144.
Length: 34 pages
Date of creation: 2010
Date of revision:
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Other versions of this item:
- Luis Angeles & Kyriakos C. Neanidis, . "Colonialism, elite Formation and corruption," Working Papers, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow 2011_02, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow.
- NEP-ALL-2010-06-26 (All new papers)
- NEP-HIS-2010-06-26 (Business, Economic & Financial History)
- NEP-PKE-2010-06-26 (Post Keynesian Economics)
- NEP-POL-2010-06-26 (Positive Political Economics)
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- Van Rijckeghem, Caroline & Weder, Beatrice, 2001. "Bureaucratic corruption and the rate of temptation: do wages in the civil service affect corruption, and by how much?," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 307-331, August.
- Angeles, Luis, 2011. "Institutions, Property Rights, and Economic Development in Historical Perspective," SIRE Discussion Papers, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE) 2011-08, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
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