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Institutions, property rights, and economic development in historical perspective

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  • Luis Angeles

Abstract

Institutions, and more specifically private property rights, have come to be seen as a major determinant of long-run economic develop- ment. We evaluate the case for property rights as an explanatory factor of the Industrial Revolution and derive some lessons for the analysis of developing countries today. We pay particular attention to the role of property rights in the accumulation of physical capital and the pro- duction of new ideas. The evidence that we review from the economic history literature does not support the institutional thesis.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow in its series Working Papers with number 2011_03.

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Date of creation: Feb 2011
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Handle: RePEc:gla:glaewp:2011_03

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Keywords: Institutions and Economic Development; Property Rights; Industrial Revolution; long-run growth.;

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References

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  1. Martin Paldam & Erich Gundlach, 2007. "Two Views on Institutions and Development: The Grand Transition vs the Primacy of Institutions," Economics Working Papers 2007-02, School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus.
  2. Romer, Paul M, 1990. "Endogenous Technological Change," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(5), pages S71-102, October.
  3. Angeles, Luis & Neanidisy, Kyriakos C., 2010. "Colonialism, Elite Formation and Corruption," SIRE Discussion Papers 2010-51, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
  4. Luis Angeles & Kyriakos C. Neanidis, 2006. "Aid Effectiveness: The Role of the Local Elite," Centre for Growth and Business Cycle Research Discussion Paper Series 80, Economics, The Univeristy of Manchester.
  5. Drelichman, Mauricio & Voth, Hans-Joachim, 2010. "Serial Defaults, Serial Profits: Returns to Sovereign Lending in Habsburg Spain, 1566-1600," Economics working papers mauricio_drelichman-2010-, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 04 Jul 2011.
  6. Stephen Knack & Philip Keefer, 1995. "Institutions And Economic Performance: Cross-Country Tests Using Alternative Institutional Measures," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 7(3), pages 207-227, November.
  7. Angeles, Luis, 2007. "Income inequality and colonialism," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 51(5), pages 1155-1176, July.
  8. Elhanan Helpman, 1992. "Innovation, Imitation, and Intellectual Property Rights," NBER Working Papers 4081, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  9. Angeles Luis, 2005. "Should Developing Countries Strengthen their Intellectual Property Rights?," The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, De Gruyter, vol. 5(1), pages 1-25, November.
  10. James Conklin, 1998. "The Theory of Sovereign Debt and Spain under Philip II," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(3), pages 483-513, June.
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  12. Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson & James A. Robinson, 2001. "Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution," NBER Working Papers 8460, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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  15. Rodrik, Dani & Subramanian, Arvind & Trebbi, Francesco, 2002. "Institutions Rule: The Primacy of Institutions Over Geography and Integration in Economic Development," CEPR Discussion Papers 3643, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  16. Quinn, Stephen, 2001. "The Glorious Revolution'S Effect On English Private Finance: A Microhistory, 1680 1705," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 61(03), pages 593-615, September.
  17. Lai, Edwin L. -C. & Qiu, Larry D., 2003. "The North's intellectual property rights standard for the South?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 183-209, January.
  18. North, Douglass C. & Weingast, Barry R., 1989. "Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 49(04), pages 803-832, December.
  19. Deardorff, Alan V, 1992. "Welfare Effects of Global Patent Protection," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 59(233), pages 35-51, February.
  20. Abhijit Banerjee & Lakshmi Iyer, 2005. "History, Institutions, and Economic Performance: The Legacy of Colonial Land Tenure Systems in India," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(4), pages 1190-1213, September.
  21. Dincecco, Mark, 2009. "Fiscal Centralization, Limited Government, and Public Revenues in Europe, 1650–1913," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 69(01), pages 48-103, March.
  22. Gustav Hansson, 2009. "What Determines Rule of Law? An Empirical Investigation of Rival Models," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 62(3), pages 371-393, 08.
  23. Douglass C. North, 2005. "Introduction to Understanding the Process of Economic Change
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  24. William Easterly & Ross Levine, 2002. "Tropics, Germs, and Crops: How Endowments Influence Economic Development," NBER Working Papers 9106, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  25. Angeles, Luis, 2010. "Institutions and Economic Development. New tests and new doubts," SIRE Discussion Papers 2010-75, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
  26. Robert E. Hall & Charles I. Jones, 1999. "Why Do Some Countries Produce So Much More Output Per Worker Than Others?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 114(1), pages 83-116, February.
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  28. Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, 2009. "This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 8973.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Luis Angeles, . "On the causes of the African Slave Trade," Working Papers 2012_15, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow.
  2. Magdalena Owczarczuk, 2013. "Property Rights as a Factor of Foreign Direct Investment. The Case of Poland," Oeconomia Copernicana, Polskie Towarzystwo Ekonomiczne Oddzial w Toruniu, Wydzial Nauk Ekonomicznych i Zarzadzania UMK, vol. 2, pages 97-116.
  3. Enrico Colombatto, 2012. "A theory of institutional legitimacy," ICER Working Papers 05-2012, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research.

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