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The Development of Corporate Governance in Toulouse: 1372-1946

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  • David Le Bris
  • William N. Goetzmann
  • Sébastien Pouget

Abstract

We document a sequence of institutional innovations associated with the corporate form over the course of several centuries in Toulouse. Shareholding companies that began in the 11th century formally incorporated themselves into two large-scale, widely held firms by 1373. In the years that followed they experienced the economic challenges and conflicts we now recognize as inherent in the separation of ownership and control. Using new and existing archival research, we show how the Toulouse firms developed institutional solutions including tradable shares, limited liability, governing boards, cash payout policies, external audits, shareholder meetings and mechanisms for re-capitalization. We examine these developments in the context of institutional economic theory and the received history of the corporation. The Toulouse companies preceded the birth of the Dutch and English East India companies by centuries. The Toulouse firms shed light on the necessary and sufficient conditions for the development of the corporate form. We show that the constellation of features associated with the corporation can appear in situations of relative economic certainty and in the context of Medieval legal code that did not require the granting of governmental approval or patent. The Toulouse firms are a unique case in which the corporation appears as a nexus of private contracts.

Suggested Citation

  • David Le Bris & William N. Goetzmann & Sébastien Pouget, 2015. "The Development of Corporate Governance in Toulouse: 1372-1946," NBER Working Papers 21335, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:21335
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    Cited by:

    1. le Bris, David, 2019. "Testing legal origins theory within France: Customary laws versus Roman code," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 1-30.
    2. le Bris, David & Goetzmann, William N. & Pouget, Sébastien, 2019. "The present value relation over six centuries: The case of the Bazacle company," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 132(1), pages 248-265.
    3. Rachelle Belinga & Blanche Segrestin, 2018. "Principals and stewards? An exploration of the role of institutional investors in corporate governance," Post-Print hal-01791931, HAL.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • G35 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Payout Policy
    • N0 - Economic History - - General
    • N2 - Economic History - - Financial Markets and Institutions
    • N8 - Economic History - - Micro-Business History
    • N83 - Economic History - - Micro-Business History - - - Europe: Pre-1913
    • O16 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Financial Markets; Saving and Capital Investment; Corporate Finance and Governance
    • P1 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies

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