This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Firms' Stakeholders and the Costs of Transparency

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Andres Almazan
Javier Suarez
Sheridan Titman

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

"We develop a model of a firm whose production process requires it to initiate and nurture a relationship with its stakeholders. Because there are spillover benefits of being associated with a "winner," the perceptions of stakeholders and potential stakeholders can affect firm value. Our analysis indicates that while transparency (i.e., generating information about a firm's quality) may improve the allocation of resources, a firm may have a higher ex ante value if information about its quality is not prematurely generated. Transparency costs arise because of asymmetric information regarding the extent to which stakeholders benefit from having a relationship with a high-quality firm. These costs are higher when firms can undertake noncontractible innovative investments that enhance the value of their stakeholder relationships. Stakeholder effects of transparency are especially important for younger firms with less established track records." Copyright (c) 2009, The Author(s) Journal Compilation (c) 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc..

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/servlet/useragent?func=synergy&synergyAction=showTOC&journalCode=jems&volume=18&issue=3&year=2009&part=null
File Format: text/html
File Function: link to full text
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Article provided by Blackwell Publishing in its journal Journal of Economics & Management Strategy.

Volume (Year): 18 (2009)
Issue (Month): 3 (09)
Pages: 871-900
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:bla:jemstr:v:18:y:2009:i:3:p:871-900

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/journals/JEMS/

Order Information:
Web: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=1058-6407&site=1

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Biais, Bruno & Perotti, Enrico C, 2003. "Entrepreneurs and New Ideas," CEPR Discussion Papers 3864, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Hellmann, Thomas F., 2002. "When Do Employees Become Entrepreneurs?," Research Papers 1770, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business. [Downloadable!]
  3. Maskin, Eric, 1999. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 66(1), pages 23-38, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Ariel Pakes & Shmuel Nitzan, 1982. "Optimum Contracts for Research Personnel, Research Employment, and the Establishment of "Rival" Enterprises," NBER Working Papers 0871, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Perotti, Enrico C. & Von Thadden, Ernst-Ludwig, 2003. "Strategic Transparency and Informed Trading: Will Capital Market Integration Force Convergence of Corporate Governance?," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 38(01), pages 61-86, March. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Joshua S. Cans & Scott Stern, 2000. "Incumbency and R&D Incentives: Licensing the Gale of Creative Destruction," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 9(4), pages 485-511, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  7. Siew Hong Teoh, 1997. "Information Disclosure and Voluntary Contributions to Public Goods," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 28(3), pages 385-406, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, 2007. "Transparency and Corporate Governance," NBER Working Papers 12875, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. April Mitchell Franco & Darren Filson, 2000. "Knowledge Diffusion through Employee Mobility," Claremont Colleges Working Papers 2000-61, Claremont Colleges. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  10. Thomas Hellmann, 2007. "Entrepreneurs and the Process of Obtaining Resources," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 16(1), pages 81-109, 03. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Easterbrook, Frank H, 1984. "Two Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(4), pages 650-59, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Anton, James J & Yao, Dennis A, 2002. "The Sale of Ideas: Strategic Disclosure, Property Rights, and Contracting," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 69(3), pages 513-31, July.
  13. Marco Pagano & Ailsa Röell, 1998. "The Choice Of Stock Ownership Structure: Agency Costs, Monitoring, And The Decision To Go Public," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 113(1), pages 187-225, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Hermalin, Benjamin E & Weisbach, Michael S, 1998. "Endogenously Chosen Boards of Directors and Their Monitoring of the CEO," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(1), pages 96-118, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  15. Bhattacharya Sudipto & Chiesa Gabriella, 1995. "Proprietary Information, Financial Intermediation, and Research Incentives," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 4(4), pages 328-357, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Verrecchia, Robert E., 2001. "Essays on disclosure," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(1-3), pages 97-180, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Burkart, Mike & Gromb, Denis & Panunzi, Fausto, 1997. "Large Shareholders, Monitoring, and the Value of the Firm," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 112(3), pages 693-728, August.
  18. Oliver Hart & John Moore, 2007. "Incomplete Contracts and Ownership: Some New thoughts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(2), pages 182-186, May. [Downloadable!]
  19. Cassiman, Bruno & Ueda, Masako, 2002. "Optimal Project Rejection and New Firm Start-Ups," CEPR Discussion Papers 3429, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  20. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1986. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 691-719, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  21. Avanidhar Subrahmanyam & Sheridan Titman, 1999. "The Going-Public Decision and the Development of Financial Markets," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 54(3), pages 1045-1082, 06. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  22. Hellmann, Thomas F & Perotti, Enrico C, 2006. "The Circulation of Ideas: Firms Versus Markets," CEPR Discussion Papers 5469, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  23. Anton, James J & Yao, Dennis A, 1994. "Expropriation and Inventions: Appropriable Rents in the Absence of Property Rights," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(1), pages 190-209, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Heski Bar-Isaac & Ian Jewitt & Clare Leaver, 2007. "Information and Human Capital Management," Economics Series Working Papers 367, University of Oxford, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. René M. Stulz, 2008. "Securities Laws, Disclosure, and National Capital Markets in the Age of Financial Globalization," NBER Working Papers 14218, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Stulze, Rene M., 2008. "Securities Laws, Disclosure, and National Capital Markets in the Age of Financial Globalization," Working Paper Series 2008-13, Ohio State University, Charles A. Dice Center for Research in Financial Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. Peter Egger & Christian Keuschnigg & Hannes Winner, 2008. "Incorporation and Taxation: Theory and Firm-level Evidence," University of St. Gallen Department of Economics working paper series 2008 2008-20, Department of Economics, University of St. Gallen. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? IDEAS also indexes software components.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-22.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.